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Abstract. State-of-the-art e-voting systems rely on voters to perform
certain actions to ensure that the election authorities are not manipulat-
ing the election result. This so-called “end-to-end (E2E) verifiability” is
the hallmark of current e-voting protocols; nevertheless, thorough anal-
ysis of current systems is still far from being complete.
In this work, we initiate the study of e-voting protocols as ceremonies.
A ceremony, as introduced by Ellison [25], is an extension of the notion
of a protocol that includes human participants as separate nodes of the
system that should be taken into account when performing the security
analysis. that centers on the two properties of end-to-end verifiability
and voter privacy and allows the consideration of arbitrary behavioural
distributions for the human participants.
We then analyse the Helios system as an e-voting ceremony. Security
in the e-voting ceremony model requires the specification of a class of
human behaviours with respect to which the security properties can be
preserved. We show how end-to-end verifiability and voter privacy are
sensitive to human behaviour in the protocol by characterizing the set of
behaviours under which the security can be preserved and also showing
explicit scenarios where it fails.
We then provide experimental evaluation with human subjects from two
different sources where people used Helios: the elections of the Interna-
tional Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) and a poll of senior
year computer science students. We report on the auditing behaviour of
the participants as we measured it and we discuss the effects on the level
of certainty that can be given by each of the two electorates.
The outcome of our analysis is a negative one: the auditing behaviour of
people (including cryptographers) is not sufficient to ensure the correct-
ness of the tally with good probability in either case studied. The same
holds true even for simulated data that capture the case of relatively well
trained participants while, finally, the security of the ceremony can be
shown but under the assumption of essentially ideally behaving human
subjects. We note that while our results are stated for Helios, they auto-
matically transfer to various other e-voting systems that, as Helios, rely
on client-side encryption to encode the voter’s choice.
1 Introduction
A ceremony, introduced by Ellison [25], extends the notion of a security protocol
to include “human nodes” in the protocol specification together with regular
computer nodes. Human nodes, are computationally limited and error-prone;
they are able to interact with computer nodes via a user interface (UI) as well
as communicate with each other via direct communication lines. In this model,
computer nodes can be thought of as stateful and probabilistic interactive Turing
machines, while human nodes, even though they are stateful, they are limited in
terms of computational power and their behaviour can only be considered as a
random variable following some arbitrary probability distribution over a set of
“admissible behaviours” that are dictated by the UI’s they are provided with.
Designing and analyzing the security of ceremonies has proven to be valuable
for problems that non-trivially rely on human node interaction to ensure their
security properties, such as key provisioning and web authentication, see e.g.,
[25,34,47,10].
In this work, we initiate the study of secure e-voting ceremonies. An e-voting
ceremony is a protocol between computer and human nodes that aims to assist
a subset of the humans (the voters) to cast a ballot for a specified election
race. We argue that viewing e-voting as a ceremony (i.e., a protocol with human
and computer nodes) captures the security intricacies of the e-voting problem
much more effectively than standard protocol based modelling as it was done
so far. The reason for this, is that the properties of an election system, most
importantly verifiability, rely on human participant behaviour in a highly non-
trivial manner. The ability of human nodes to compromise overall security due
to their negligence is well known in e-voting system design (cf. [32]) and it is
high time that cryptographic models extend to incorporate formally the human
participants.
The capability to perform auditing is widely accepted as the most important
characteristic for modern e-voting systems. However, even widely deployed1 sys-
tems such as Helios [1] that are touted to be verifiable via auditing still provide
only unquantified guarantees of verifiability. The main reason for this is that the
correctness of the election result when the election authorities are adversarial is
impossible to verify unless the humans that participate in the protocol follow a
suitable behaviour. This means that the voters, beyond the ballot-casting pro-
cedure, are supposed to carry out additional steps that many may find to be
counterintuitive, see e.g., [45] for more discussion of this issue. This potentially
leads to the defective execution of the appropriate steps that are to be carried
out for verifiability to be supported and hence the verifiability of the election
may collapse. Recent studies have shown that voters have rather limited par-
ticipation and interest to perform the verification steps (e.g., [24] reports about
23 out of a sample of 747 people performed a verifiability check in a deployed
end-to-end (E2E) verifiable system). Given that the auditing performed by the
voters is critical for the integrity of the election result as a whole, it is imperative
to determine the class of distributions of behaviours that are able to detect (sig-
nificant) misbehaviour of the election authorities. Once this class is characterised
then one may then try to influence participants to approximate the behaviour
by training them.
Traditionally, cf. [11,48,30,16,13,44], election verifiability was considered at
the “individual level” (i.e., a single voter is able to verify her vote intent is prop-
1 The web-site of the project reports that more than 100,000 votes have been cast
with the system.
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erly included in the tally) and the “universal level” (i.e., the election transcript
appears to be properly formed). No voter behavioural characteristics were taken
into account in the security analysis and the protocols were deemed “end-to-
end verifiable” as long as they satisfied merely these two features2. The work of
[39,40,41] showed that individual verifiability and universal verifiability, even if
combined, can still fail to guarantee that the election tally is correct. To mend the
concept of verifiability, a “holistic” notion of global verifiability was introduced.
Nevertheless, such global verifiability is unattainable without any assumption
on human behaviour. Indeed, [41] establishes the verifiability of the Helios sys-
tem by assuming that voters perform an unbounded number of independent coin
flips — an assumption which should be at best considered of theoretical interest,
since no voter using the Helios system (or any e-voting system for that matter)
should be expected to actually perform ballot-casting via the employment of
independent coin flips.
Beyond verifiability, an e-voting system is supposed to also satisfy privacy
and other desired properties such as receipt-freeness/coercion resistance. These
properties interact with verifiability in various important ways: First, without
privacy it is substantially easier to achieve verifiability (this is due to the fact
that verification of the recording of one’s vote can be done in relatively straight-
forward manner assuming a public “bulletin-board” [4]). Second, receipt-freeness
combined with verifiability suggests that the receipt obtained by the voter from
ballot-casting can be delegated to a third-party without fear of coercion or pri-
vacy leakage. Given these reasons, a proper analysis of an e-voting system should
also include the analysis of at least these properties. The fact that privacy will
be entrusted to a set of “trustees” that are human participants in the e-voting
system, points again to the importance of the ceremony approach for the case
of privacy.
Our results. Our results are as follows.
 We initiate the study of e-voting ceremonies, i.e., e-voting protocols that
involve computer and human nodes, and enable the human participant voters to
cast privately their ballots and calculate their tally. In an execution of an e-voting
ceremony, human nodes follow a certain behaviour which is sampled according
to some distribution over all possible admissible behaviours. No specific assump-
tions can be made about how human nodes behave and thus the distribution
of each human node is a parameter of the security analysis. It follows that the
security properties of e-voting ceremonies are conditional on vectors of proba-
bility distributions of human behaviours. Such vectors are specified over sets of
suitably defined deterministic finite state machines with output (transducers3)
that determine all possible ways that each human participant may interact with
the UI’s of the computer nodes that are available to them.
2 A notable departure from this restriction is [51], nevertheless no formal security
analysis is performed for the verifiability of this system.
3 We opt to use a finite state machine for voters in order to emphasise that voters do
not perform complex calculations. Nevertheless, our model readily generalises if one
is willing to assume that voters can perform more complex tasks.
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 Extending the work of [41,36], we provide a threat model for (end-to-end)
verifiability for e-voting ceremonies. Our threat model has the following charac-
teristics: (i) it provides a holistic approach to argue about end-to-end verifiability
by casting the property as an “attack game” played between the adversary and a
challenger. (ii) it provides an explicit final goal the adversary wants to achieve by
introducing a metric over all possible election outcomes and stating an explicit
amount of deviation that the adversary wants to achieve in this metric space.
(iii) the adversary is successful provided that the election tally appears to be
correct even though it deviates from the true tally according to the stated met-
ric while the number of complaining voters in any failed ballot-casting processes
is below a threshold (a ballot-casting process may fail because of adversarial
interference). (iv) the resources of the adversary include the complete control of
all trustees, election authorities, all voter PC’s as well as a subset of the vot-
ers themselves. Regarding privacy, we extend the work of [8,36], by providing a
threat model for privacy and passive coercion resistance in the sense of [2] for
e-voting ceremonies.
 We cast Helios as an e-voting ceremony: voters and trustees are the hu-
man participants of the protocol that are supposed to handle credentials and
receipts as well as generate and validate ciphertexts. During ballot-casting, vot-
ers perform the Benaloh challenge process [5] and are free to choose to cast their
ballot. Voters may further choose to audit their ballot in the bulletin board if
they wish to. Trustees are supposed to execute deterministic steps in order to
perform the public-key generation during the setup stage of the election and
are able to verify their public-key in the bulletin board if they wish. The set of
admissible behaviours for voters include any number of Benaloh challenges fol-
lowed by casting the ciphertext and choosing whether to audit it in the bulletin
board.
 We analyse the Helios e-voting ceremony with respect to the threat-model
for privacy and passive coercion and end-to-end verifiability. The behaviours
of voters are an explicit component of the security analysis. Specifically, for
end-to-end verifiability, we characterise the space of admissible behaviours that
enable the verifiability of the election result and we prove an infeasibility and a
feasibility result:
1. it is infeasible to detect a large deviation in the published tally of the election
even if a high number of voters audit it, if (i) there is some i that the average
voter will perform exactly i Benaloh audits with high enough probability
compared to the tolerance level of complaints, or (ii) there is a set of indices
J that if the average voter performs j ∈ J Benaloh audits, this can be used
as a predictor for not auditing the bulletin board; (see Theorem 1 for the
precise formulation of the infeasibility result).
2. it is feasible to detect a deviation in the tally if a suitable number of voters
audit the election, provided that (i) for all i the probability that the adver-
sary performs exactly i Benaloh audits is sufficiently small, and (ii) if the
number j of Benaloh audits can be used as a predictor of not auditing the
bulletin board, then it holds that the likelihood of j Benaloh audits is suf-
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ficiently small; (see Theorem 2 for the precise formulation of the feasibility
result).
Regarding privacy, we show that assuming the trustees audit with sufficiently
high probability the correct posting of the public-key information, Helios main-
tains privacy under the assumption that the underlying public-key encryption
scheme is IND-CPA.
 We provide an experimental evaluation from two different sources of hu-
man data where people used Helios. We report on the auditing behaviour of the
participants as we measured it and we discuss the effects on the level of certainty
that can be given in each of the two elections. The message from our evaluation
is a negative one: The behaviour profile of people is not such that it can pro-
vide sufficient certainty on the correctness of the election result. For instance,
as we show from the data collected from the elections of the directors of the
International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), for elections in the
order of hundreds (500) more than 3% of the votes could be overturned with
significant probability of no detection (25%), cf. Figure 2. Based on public data
on recent election results of the IACR the votes for elected candidates were suffi-
ciently close to candidates that lost in the election and consequently, the results
could have been overturned with significant probability without being detected,
cf. Table 3. Our results are similarly negative in the second human experiment.
Given our negative results for actual human data we turn to simulated results
for investigating the case when people are supposedly well trained. Even for a
voter behaviour distribution with supposedly relatively well trained voters our
simulated experiment show that the validity of the election result is sustained
with rather low confidence.
We note that even though we focused on Helios in this work, our results
(including our threat-model analysis for ceremonies and associated security the-
orems) immediately apply to a number of other e-voting systems. Such systems
(that have been identified as single-pass systems in [8]) include [20,21,22,35,50].
Related work. Ceremony study. In 2008, protocol ‘ceremony’ was introduced
by Ellison [25] to expand a security protocol with out-of-band channels and
the human users. Subsequently, Karlof, Tygar, and Wagner [33] formalised the
‘conditioned-safe ceremony’ notion, that encompasses forcing functions, defence
in depth, and human tendencies. They then evaluated an e-mail web authentica-
tion ceremony with 200 participants. Later, the strengths and weaknesses of the
‘ceremony’ notion were examined by Radke et al. [46] in the context of HTTPS,
EMV and Opera Mini protocols/ceremonies. In 2013, Carlos et al. [9,42] claimed
that even though Dolev-Yao’s threat model can represent the most powerful at-
tacker in a ceremony, the attacker in this model is not realistic in certain scenar-
ios, especially those related to human peers. They then proposed a threat model
that can be adjusted according to each ceremony and consequently adapt the
model and the ceremony analysis to realistic scenarios. In 2014, Hatunic-Webster
et al. [28] proposed an Anti-Phishing Authentication Ceremony Framework for
investigating phishing attacks in authentication ceremonies, which builds on
the human-in-the-loop security framework of communication processing. Bella
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and Coles-Kemp [3] introduced a layered analysis of security ceremonies. Their
work focuses on the human-computer interaction layer, which features a socio-
technical protocol between a user “persona” and a computer interface. As a
more related work, in 2015, Johansen and Jøsang [29] proposed a formal proba-
bilistic model for verifying a security ceremony. In their work, the human agent
interaction with the user interface are modelled as a non-deterministic process.
E-voting modelling. Conventionally, the verifiability and privacy of an e-
voting system is modelled and analysed separately. In terms of the verifiabil-
ity, individual verifiability [11] and universal verifiability [48,30] was introduced
about 20 years ago. End-to-end verifiability in the sense of cast-as-intended,
recorded-as-cast, tallied-as-recorded was introduced by [13] and [44] in 2004. The
term of End-to-end verifiability/integrity also appeared in [18]. Later, Ku¨sters
et al. [39] formally proposed symbolic and computational definitions of verifia-
bility. The verifiability of Helios was studied in both symbolic model [38] and
computational model [49]. [40] showed that individual verifiability and universal
verifiability are not sufficient to guarantee the “global” verifiability of an e-voting
system and In [41], they introduced clash attacks, which break the verifiability
of some variants of Helios. In terms of privacy, computational privacy was intro-
duced by Benaloh and Fischer [17], while receipt-freeness has been first studied
by Benaloh and Tuinstra [6]. Formal definitions for privacy and receipt-freeness
have been proposed in the context of applied pi calculus [23] and the universal
composability model [27,43]. In [40], the level of privacy of an e-voting system is
measured w.r.t. to the observation power the adversary has in a protocol run. In
[7], Bernhard et al. proposed a game-based notion of ballot privacy and study
the privacy of Helios. Their definition was extended by Bernhard, Pereira and
Warinschi [8] by allowing the adversary to statically corrupt election authori-
ties. Both these definitions, although they imply a strong indistinguishability
property, do not consider receipt-freeness.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we intro-
duce the entities, the syntax and the security framework of an e-voting ceremony.
In Section 3, we describe the Helios e-voting ceremony according to our syntax.
In Section 4, we analyse the E2E verifiability of Helios ceremony. Namely, we
prove (I) an infeasibility and (II) a feasibility result under specific classes of
voter behaviours, and we comment on the logical tightness of the two classes. In
Section 5, we prove the voter privacy/passive coercion resistance of the Helios
ceremony. In Section 6, we present evaluations of our results for the E2E ver-
ifiability of Helios ceremony. Our evaluations are based on actual human data
obtained by elections using Helios as well as simulated data for various sets of
parameters. Finally, in the concluding Section 7, where we recall the objectives,
methodology, analysis and results of this paper and discuss future work.
2 E-Voting Ceremonies
A ceremony [25] is an extension of a network protocol that involves human nodes
along side computer nodes. Computer nodes will be modeled in a standard way
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while we will model humans as probability distributions over a support set of
simple finite state machines. We base our framework for ceremonies on the e-
voting system modeling from [36] suitably extending it to our setting.
2.1 The entities of the e-voting ceremony
An e-voting ceremony VC is associated with three parameters set to be polyno-
mial in the security parameter λ; the number of voters n, the number of options
m and the number of trustees k. We use the notation O = {opt1, ..., optm} for
the set of options, V = {V1, ..., Vn} for the set of voters and T = {T1, . . . , Tk}
for the set of trustees. The allowed ways to vote is determined by the collection
of subsets U ⊆ 2O an the option selection U` of voter V` is an element in U .
Let U∗ be the set of vectors of option selections of arbitrary length. Let f be
the election evaluation function from U∗ to the set Zm+ so that f(U1, . . . ,Un) is
equal to an m-vector whose i-th location is equal to the number of times optj
was chosen in the option selections U1, . . . ,Un.
EA
CD
BB
T1ASD TSD
T2ASD TSD
...
TkASD TSD
...
VnVSD ASD
V2VSD ASD
V1VSD ASD
Fig. 1: The entities and the channels active in an e-voting ceremony. The human nodes
and the computer nodes used are shown as circles and rectangles respectively. Each
voter or trustee human node, interacts with two computer nodes (supporting devices)
while the CD human node interacts with the EA. The dotted lines denote read-only
access on the BB. The dotted lines denote read-only access on the BB. The grey dashed
lines denote channels between human nodes.
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The interaction among the entities involved in an e-voting ceremony is de-
picted in Figure 1. The said entities comprise:
 The human nodes are the trustees T1, . . . , Tk, the voters V1, . . . , Vn and the
credential distributor (CD). The latter additional entity is responsible for
issuing the credentials generated at the setup phase to the voters. Note that
in practice, the CD may be an organization of more than one human nodes
executing another ceremony but we do not model this as part of the e-voting
ceremony. Here we make the simplifying choice of modeling CD as a single
human node (that is able to identify voters using an external identification
mechanism operating among humans).
 The computer nodes are the voting supporting devices (VSDs), the trustee
supporting devices (TSDs), the auditing supporting devices (ASDs), the elec-
tion authority (EA), and the bulletin board (BB).
Modelling human nodes. We model each human node as a collection of simple
finite state machines that can communicate with computer nodes (via a user
interface) as well as with each other via direct communication. Specifically, we
consider a -potentially infinite- collection of transducers, i.e. finite state ma-
chines with an input and an output tape, that is additionally equipped with a
communication tape.
We restrict the size of each voter transducer to depend only on the number of
options m. Note that this has the implication that the voter transducer cannot
be used to perform cryptographic operations, which require polynomial number
of steps in λ. Transducers may interact with computer nodes, (supporting de-
vices) and use them to produce ciphertexts and transmit them to other computer
nodes. The transducers interact with each other via human level communication
channels (depicted as dashed gray lines in Figure 1), where the exchanged mes-
sages are readable by humans (e.g. credentials, PINs, or short message texts but
not cryptographic data).
Transducer collections corresponding to voter nodes, trustee nodes and the
CD will be denoted as the sets MV , MT , and MCD respectively. We assume
that all sets MV ,MT and MCD are polynomial time samplable, i.e., one can
produce the description of a transducer from the set in polynomial-time and
they have an efficient membership test.
2.2 Syntax and Semantics
In order to express the threat model for the e-voting ceremony, we need to
formally describe the syntax and semantics of the procedures executed by the
ceremony. We think of an e-voting ceremony VC as a quintuple of algorithms
and ceremonies denoted by 〈Setup,Cast,Tally, Result,Verify〉 together with
the sets of transducers MV ,MT and MCD that express the human node oper-
ations; these are specified as follows:
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The Setup(1λ,O,V,U , T ) ceremony : The setup phase is a ceremony executed
by the EA, the BB, the transducers Mi1 , . . . ,Min ∈ MV that determine the
behaviour of voter V1, . . . , Vn respectively, a transducer M
CD ∈MCD describing
the behaviour of CD, the transducers MTi ∈ MT , i = 1, . . . , k describing the
behaviour of the trustees T1, . . . Tk respectively and their TSDs. The ceremony
generates VC’s public parameters info (which include O,V,U) and the voter
credentials cr1, . . . , crn. After the ceremony execution, each TSD has a private
state sti, each trustee Ti obtains a secret si and the CD obtains the credentials
cr1, . . . , crn. In addition, the EA posts an election transcript τ initialised as info
on BB. At the end of the Setup, the CD will provide cr1, . . . , crn to the voters
V1, . . . , Vn.
The Cast ceremony : The voting phase is a ceremony executed by the EA, the
BB, a transducer Mi` ∈MV that determines the behaviour of voter V` and her
supporting devices VSD`, ASD`. V` executes the Cast ceremony according to the
behaviour Mi` as follows: Mi` has input (cr`,U`), where cr` is the voter’s cre-
dential and U` represents the option selection of V`. All communication between
the voter V` and EA (resp. BB) happens via VSD` (resp. ASD`), where BB has
input τ . Upon successful termination, Mi` ’s output tape contains the individual
audit information audit` returned by VSD`. If the termination is not successful,
Mi` ’s output tape possibly contains a special symbol ‘Complain’, indicating that
voter V` has decided to complain about the incorrect execution of the election
procedure. In any case of termination (successful or not), Mi` ’s output tape may
contain a special symbol ‘Audit’, indicating that V` has taken the decision to use
her individual audit information audit` to perform verification at the end of the
election; in this case, the individual audit information audit` will be provided as
input to the ASD of V`. At the end of the ceremony, EA updates its state and
BB updates the public transcript τ as necessary.
The Tally ceremony : After voting period ends, the tally phase is a ceremony
executed by the EA, the BB and the trustees MTi ∈MT , i = 1, . . . , k as well as
their TSDs. Namely, the EA provides each trustee with the set of cast votes Vtally.
Then, the trustees collectively compute the election result and upon successful
termination and update the public transcript τ in the BB either directly or via
the EA.
The Result(τ) algorithm : The election result can be computed from any party
by parsing the election transcript.
The Verify(τ, audit) algorithm : The verification algorithm outputs a value in
{0, 1}, where audit is a voter’s individual audit information obtained after the
voter’s engagement in the Cast protocol.
The correctness of VC is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Correctness). The e-voting ceremony VC has (perfect) correct-
ness, if for any honest execution of VC with respect to any CD behavior in MCD
and any set of trustees’ behaviours specified in MT that result in a public tran-
script τ where the voters V1, . . . , Vn cast votes for options U1, . . . ,Un following
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any of the behaviors inMV and received individual audit information α1, . . . , αn,
it holds that (i) Result(τ) = f(U1, . . . ,Un) and (ii)
∧n
`=1 Verify(τ, α`) = 1.
2.3 Threat model for E2E Verifiability
In order to define the threat model for E2E verifiability we need first to deter-
mine the adversarial objective. Intuitively, the objective of the adversary is to
manipulate the election result without raising suspicion amongst the participat-
ing voters. To express this formally, we have to introduce a suitable notation;
given that option selections are elements of a set of m choices, we may encode
them as m-bit strings, where the bit in the i-th position is 1 if and only if option
Pi is selected. Further, we may aggregate the election results as the list with
the number of votes each option has received, thus the output of the Result
algorithm is a vector in Zm+ . In this case, a result is feasible if and only if the
sum of any of its coordinates is no greater than the number of voters.
Vote extractor. Borrowing from [36], in order to express the threat model for
E2E verifiability properly, we will ask for a vote extractor algorithm E (not
necessarily efficient, e.g., not running in polynomial-time) that receives as input
the election transcript τ and the set of individual audit information {α`}`∈Vsucc ,
where by Vsucc, we denote the set of honest voters that voted successfully. Given
such input, E will attempt to compute n−|Vsucc| vectors 〈U`〉V`∈V\Vsucc in {0, 1}m
which correspond to all the voters outside of Vsucc and can be either a option
selection, if the voter has voted adversarially or a zero vector, if the voter has
not voted successfully. In case E is incapable of presenting such selection, the
symbol ⊥ will be returned instead. The purpose of the algorithm E is to express
the requirement that the election transcript τ that is posted by the EA in the BB
at the end of the procedure contains (in potentially encoded form) a set of well-
formed actual votes. Using this notion of extractor, we are capable to express
the “actual” result encoded in an election transcript despite the fact that the
adversary controls some voters. Note when the extractor E fails it means that τ
is meaningless as an election transcript and thus unverifiable.
Election result deviation.Next, we want to define a measure of deviation from
the actual election result, as such deviation is the objective of the adversary in
an E2E verifiability attack. This will complete the requirements for expressing
the adversarial objective in the E2E attack game. To achieve this, it is natural
to equip the space of results with a metric. We use the metric derived by the
1-norm, ‖ · ‖1 scaled to half, i.e.,
d1 : Zm+ × Zm+ −→ R
(w,w′) 7−→ 12 · ‖w − w′‖1 = 12 ·
∑n
i=1 |wi − w′i|,
where wi, w
′
i is the i-th coordinate of w,w
′ respectively.
Let R ∈ Zm+ be the election results that correspond to the true voter intent
of n voters, and R′ ∈ Zm+ be the published election results. Denote by max(U),
the maximum cardinality of an element in U . Then, two encodings of option
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selections are within max(U) distance, so intuitively, if the adversary wants to
present u′ as the result of the election, it may do that by manipulating the votes
of at least d1(R,R
′)/max(U) voters. This means that e.g., in simple 1-out-of-
m voting, moving i votes from one option to another translates to a distance
d1(R,R
′) of exactly i.
The E2E verifiability game.Let D = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉 be a
vector of distributions that consists of the distributions D1, . . . ,Dn over the
collection of voter transducers MV , the distributions DT1 , . . . ,DTk over the col-
lection of trustee transducers MT and the distribution DCD over the collec-
tion of CD transducers MCD. We define the E2E verifiability Ceremony game
GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E between the adversary A and a challenger C w.r.t. D and the vote
extractor E which takes as input the security parameter λ, the number of voters
n, the number of options m, and the number of trustees k and is parameterised
by (i) the deviation amount δ, (according to the metric d1(·, ·)) that the adver-
sary wants to achieve, (ii) the number of honest voters θ, that terminate the
Cast ceremony successfully and (iii) the number of honest voters φ, that submit
a complaint in case of unsuccessful termination during the Cast ceremony.
Throughout the game, the adversary fully controls the election by corrupting
the EA and all the trustees T = {T1, . . . Tk}, while the CD remains honest
during the setup phase. In addition, it corrupts all the voters VSDs and manages
the Cast ceremony executions. For each voter V`, the adversary may choose
to corrupt V` or to allow the challenger to play on her behalf. Note that the
challenger retains the control of the ASD4 for honest voters and samples for
each honest voter a transducer from the corresponding distribution. If a voter V`
is uncorrupted, the adversary provides the option selection that V` should use in
the Cast ceremony; the challenger samples a transducer Mi`
D`←−MV from voter
transducer distribution D` and then executes the Cast ceremony according to
Mi` ’s description to vote the given option selection and decide whether to audit
the election result at the end. The adversary finally posts the election transcript
in the BB. The adversary will win the game provided that there are at least
θ of honest voters that terminate the ballot-casting successfully and at most
φ complaining honest voters, but the deviation of the tally is bigger than δ
w.r.t. d1 or the extractor fails to produce the option election of the dishonest
voters. The entities that are adversarially controlled in the game are presented
in Appendix A.1. The attack game is specified in detail in Figure 2.
Definition 2. Let  ∈ [0, 1] and n,m, k, δ, θ, φ ∈ N with θ, φ ≤ n. The e-voting
ceremony VC w.r.t. the election function f achieves E2E verifiability with error
, transducer distribution vector D, a number of at least θ honest successful
voters, at most φ honest complaining voters and tally deviation at most d if
there exists a (not necessarily polynomial-time) vote extractor E such that for
every PPT adversary A:
Pr[GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1] ≤ .
4 In the voting phase client-side encryption systems like Helios [1], the voters’ ASDs
must be live for potential ballot auditing.
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E2E Verifiability Ceremony Game GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k)
 The adversary A chooses a list of options O = {opt1, ..., optm}, a set of voters
V = {V1, ..., Vn}, a set of trustees T = {T1, . . . Tk} and the set of allowed
option selections U . It provides Ch with the sets O,V, T ,U . Throughout the
game, the challenger C plays the role of the BB.
 C and A engage in the Setup ceremony on input (1λ,O,V,U , T ) with A
playing the role of EA and all trustees and their associated TSDs while C
plays the role of CD by following the transducer MCD
DCD←−MCD. In this way
C obtains info and the voter credentials cr1, . . . , crn. . If the CD refuses to
distribute the credentials to the voters, then the game terminates.
 A and C engage in an interaction where A schedules the Cast ceremonies
of all voters. For each voter V`, A can either completely control the voter
or allow C operate on their behalf. In the latter case. A provides a option
selection U` to C which samples a transducer Mi`
D`←−MV and engages with
the adversary A in the Cast ceremony so that A plays the role of VSD` and
EA and C plays the role of V` according to transducer Mi` on input (cr`,U`)
and its associated ASD`. Provided the ceremony terminates successfully, C
obtains the individual audit information audit` produced by Mi` , on behalf
of V`.
 Finally, A posts the election transcript τ to the BB.
We define the following subsets of honest voters (i.e., those controlled by C):
– Vsucc is the set of honest voters that terminated successfully.
– Vcomp is the set of honest voters s.t. the special symbol ‘Complain’ is written
on the output tape of the corresponding transducer.
– Vaudit is the set of honest voters s.t. the special symbol ‘Audit’ is written on
the output tape of the corresponding transducer.
The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following conditions hold
true:
1. |Vsucc| ≥ θ,
2. |Vcomp| ≤ φ, (i.e., at most φ honest voters complain).
3. ∀` ∈ [n] : if V` ∈ Vaudit, then Verify(τ, audit`) = 1 .
and either one of the following two conditions:
4. (a) If ⊥ 6= 〈U`〉V`∈V\Vsucc ← E(τ, {audit`}V`∈Vsucc), then
d1(Result(τ), f(〈U1, . . . ,Un〉)) ≥ δ .
(b) ⊥ ← E(τ, {audit`}V`∈Vsucc).
Fig. 2: The E2E Verifiability Ceremony Game between the challenger C and the
adversary A w.r.t. the vote extractor E and the vector of transducer distributions
D = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉.
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Remark 1 (Universal voter distribution). We have introduced the collection of
transducersMV ,MT ,MCD to model all possible admissible behaviors that vot-
ers, trustees and credential distributors respectively might follow to successfully
complete the e-voting ceremony. Note that in the security modeling of the e-
voting ceremony, each voter V` is associated with a distribution D` over MV ,
which captures its voter profile. For instance, the voter V1 may behave as trans-
ducer M1 with 50% probability, M2 with 30% probability, and M3 with 20%
probability. In some e-voting systems, the voters can be uniquely identified dur-
ing the Cast ceremonies, e.g. the voter’s real ID is used. Hence, the adversary
is able to identify each voter V` and learn its profile expressed by D`. Then, the
adversary may choose the best attack strategy depending on D`. Nevertheless,
in case the credentials are randomly and anonymously assigned to the voters by
the CD, the adversary will not be able to profile voters given his view in the
ballot-casting ceremony (recall that in the E2E game the CD remains honest).
Therefore, it is possible to unify the distributions to a universal voter distribu-
tion, denoted as D, which reflects the profile of the “average voter.” Specifically,
in this case, we will have D1 = · · · = Dn = D.
2.4 Threat model for Voter Privacy (including passive coercion
resistance)
The threat model of privacy concerns the actions that may be taken by the
adversary to figure out the choices of the honest voters. We specify the goal of
the adversary in a very general way. In particular, for an attack against privacy
to succeed, we ask that there is an election result, for which the adversary is
capable of distinguishing how people vote while it has access to (i) the actual
individual audit information that the voters obtain after ballot-casting as well
as (ii) a set of ceremony views that are consistent with all the honest voters’
views in the Cast ceremony instances they participate.
Observe that any system that is secure against such a threat scenario pos-
sesses also “passive coercion resistance”, i.e., voters cannot prove how they voted
by showing the individual audit information ceremony or even presenting the
view they obtain from the Cast. Given that in the threat model we allow the
adversary to observe the view of the voter in the Cast ceremony, we need to
allow the voter to be able to lie about her view (otherwise an attack could be
trivially mounted). We stress that the simulated view of the voter in the Cast
ceremony does not contain the view of the internals of the VSD. This means
that, with respect to privacy, the adversary may not look into the internals of
the VSD for the honest voters. The above is consistent, for instance, with the
scenario that the voter can give to the VSD her option choice to be encoded.
While the adversary will be allowed to observe a simulated view of the voter
during the Cast ceremony, it will be denied access to the internals of the VSD
during the Cast execution. This increases the opportunities where the voter can
lie about how she executes the Cast ceremony.
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The Voter Privacy Game. Following the same logic as in the E2E Verifiability
game, we specify a vector of transducer distributions over the collection of voter
transducers MV , trustee transducers MT and CD transducers MCD denoted
by D = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉. We then express the threat model as a
Voter Privacy game, denoted by GA,S,Dt-priv , that is played between an adversary A
and a challenger C, that takes as input the security parameter λ, the number of
voters n, the number of options m, and the number of trustees k as described in
Figure 3 and returns 1 or 0 depending on whether the adversary wins. An impor-
tant feature of the voter privacy game is the existence of an efficient simulator S
that provides a simulated view of the voter in the Cast ceremony. Note that the
simulator is not responsible to provide the view of the voter’s supporting device
(VSD). Intuitively, this simulator captures the way the voter can lie about her
choice in the Cast ceremony in case she is coerced to present her view after she
completes the ballot-casting procedure. The parties controlled by the adversary
during a privacy attack are presented in Appendix A.2.
The attack game is parameterised by t, v. The adversary starts by selecting
the voter, option and trustee identities for given parameters n,m, k and deter-
mines the allowed ways to vote. The challenger subsequently flips a coin b (that
will change its behaviour during the course of the game) and will perform the
Setup ceremony with the adversary playing the role of the EA, the CD and up
to t trustees along with their associated TSDs and ASDs. The honest trustees’
behaviours will be determined by transducers selected at random by the chal-
lenger from MT according to the corresponding distribution. Subsequently, the
adversary will schedule all Cast ceremonies selecting which voters it prefers to
corrupt and which ones it prefers to allow to vote honestly. The adversary is
allowed to corrupt at most v voters and their VSDs. In addition, A is allowed
to corrupt the ASDs of all voters. The voters that remain uncorrupted are oper-
ated by the challenger and they are given two option selections to vote. For each
uncorrupted voter V`, the challenger first samples a transducer Mi` ← D` and
then executes the Cast ceremony according to Mi` ’s description to vote one of
its two option selections based on b.
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Voter Privacy Game GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1
λ, n,m, k)
 A on input 1λ, n,m, k, chooses a list of options O = {opt1, ..., optm}, a set of
voters V = {V1, ..., Vn}, a set of trustees T = {T1, ..., Tk} a trustee Th ∈ T
and the set of allowed option selections U . It provides C with the sets O,V,U
as well as the set of corrupted trustees Tcorr.
 C flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and performs the Setup ceremony on input
(1λ,O,V,U , T ) with the adversary playing the role of the EA,CD and all
trustees in Tcorr, while C plays the role of all the honest trustees. The role of
every honest trustee Th ∈ T \ Tcorr is played by C following the transducers
MTh
DTh←− MT .
 The adversary A and the challenger C engage in an interaction where A
corrupts the EA and schedules the Cast ceremonies of all voters which may
run concurrently. A also controls the ASDs of all voters. At the onset of each
voter ceremony, A chooses whether voter V`, ` = 1, . . . , n and its associated
VSD is corrupted or not.
• If V` and its associated VSD are corrupted, then no specific action is
taken by the challenger, as the execution is internal to adversary.
• If V` and its associated VSD are not corrupted, then A provides C with
two option selections 〈U0` ,U1` 〉. The challenger samples Mi`
D`←− MV
and sets V`’s input to (cr`,Ub` ), where cr` is the credential provided by
the adversarially controlled CD. Then, C and A engage in the Cast
ceremony with C controlling V` (that behaves according to Mi`) and
her VSD, while the adversary A observes the network interaction. When
the Cast ceremony terminates, the challenger C provides to A: (i) the
individual audit information audit` that V` obtains from the ceremony,
and (ii) if b = 0, the current view of the internal state of the voter V` that
the challenger obtains from the Cast execution, or if b = 1, a simulated
view of the internal state of V` produced by S(viewC), where viewC is the
current view of the challenger.
 A and C engaging in the Tally ceremony with the adversary playing the role
of the EA,CD and all trustees in Tcorr, while C plays the role of all the honest
trustees.
 Finally, A terminates returning a bit b∗.
Denote the set of corrupted voters as Vcorr. The game returns a bit which is 1 if
and only if the following hold true:
1. b = b∗ (i.e., the adversary guesses b correctly).
2. |Tcorr| ≤ t (i.e., the number of corrupted trustees is bounded by t).
3. |Vcorr| ≤ v (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by v).
4. f(〈U0` 〉V`∈V\Vcorr) = f(〈U1` 〉V`∈V\Vcorr) (i.e., the election result w.r.t. the set of
non-corrupted voters does not leak b).
Fig. 3: The Voter Privacy Game between the challenger C and the adversary
A w.r.t. the view simulator S and the vector of transducer distributions D =
〈D1, . . . ,Dn,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉.
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The adversary will also receive the individual audit information that is ob-
tained by each voter as well as either (i) the actual view (if b = 0) or (ii)
a simulated view, generated by S (if b = 1), of each voter during the Cast
ceremony (this addresses the individual audit information-freeness aspect of the
attack game). Upon completion of ballot-casting, the adversary will execute with
the challenger the Tally ceremony and subsequently the adversary will attempt
to guess b. The attack is successful provided that the election result is the same
with respect to the two alternatives provided for each honest voter by the ad-
versary and the adversary manages to guess the challenger’s bit b correctly. The
game is presented in detail in Figure 3.
Definition 3. Let m,n, k, t, v ∈ N with t ≤ k and v ≤ n. Let VC be an e-voting
ceremony with m options, n voters and k trustees w.r.t. the evaluation election
unction f . We say that VC achieves voter privacy with error  for transducer
distribution vector D, at most t corrupted trustees and v corrupted voters, if
there is an efficient simulator S such that for any PPT adversary A:∣∣∣∣Pr[GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤  ,
Threat model alternatives. The framework presented in this section is a first at-
tempt to model human behaviour in the cryptographic e-voting analysis, there-
fore various approaches or extensions could be considered. In Appendix A.3, we
discuss on some selected possible alterantives on this subject.
3 Syntax of Helios Ceremony
In this section, we present a formal description of Helios ceremony according
to the syntax provided in Subsection 2.2. For simplicity, we consider the case
of 1-out-of-m elections, where the set of allowed selections U is the collection of
singletons, {{opt1}, . . . , {optm}}, from the set of options O. Our syntax does not
reflect the current implemented version of Helios, as it adapts necessary min-
imum modifications to make Helios secure. For instance, we ensure that each
voter is given a unique identifier to prevent Helios from the clash attacks in-
troduced in [41]. In addition, we consider a hash function H(·) that all parties
have oracle access to, used for committing to election information and ballot
generation, as well as the Fiat-Shamir transformations [26] in the NIZK proofs
that the system requires. As we state below, in the generation of the NIZK
proofs for ballot correctness, the unique identifier is included in the hash to pre-
vent replaying attacks presented in [19]. Moreover, we apply strong Fiat-Shamir
transformations, where the statement of the NIZK should also be included in
the hash. As shown in [8], strong Fiat-Shamir based NIZKs are simulation sound
extractable, while weak Fiat-Shamir based NIZKs make the Helios vulnerable.
Finally, we stress that we model trustees’ behaviour by considering the event
that the trustee will or will not the verify the correct posting of its partial public
key. This is done so that we capture the possible privacy vulnerability in Helios’s
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implementation architecure studied in [37]; that is, in the case where no honest
trustee performs such verification then a malicious EA may act as man-in-the-
middle and replace the trustees’ partial public keys with ones it adversarially
generates, thus resulting to a total break of voters’ privacy.
The Helios’s transducers :
We define the collections of transducers MV ,MT ,MCD that reflect the ad-
missible behaviours of voters, trustees and CD respectively.
The set of admissible voter transducers is denoted byMV := {Mi,c,a}c,a∈{0,1}i∈[0,q] ,
where q ∈ N; The transducer Mi,c,a audits the ballot created by the VSD exactly
i times (using its ASD) and then submits the (i + 1)-th ballot created by the
VSD; Upon successful termination, it outputs a individual audit information
audit obtained from the VSD; If the termination is not successful and c = 1,
Mi,c,a outputs a special symbol ‘Complain’ to complain about its failed engage-
ment in the Cast ceremony. In any case of termination, when a = 1, Mi,c,a
also outputs a special symbol ‘Audit’ and sends audit to the ASD. To guarantee
termination, we limit the maximum number of ballot audits by threshold q.
The admissible trustee transducers are two and labelled as MT0 ,M
T
1 (so that
MT = {MT0 ,MT1 }). At a high level, both MT0 and MT1 will utilise the TSD to
generate a partial public/secret key pair in the Setup ceremony. However, only
MT1 will verify the correct posting of its partial public key in the BB, whereas
MT0 will have no other interaction with the election.
The CD is required to check the validity of the credentials cr1, . . . , crn gen-
erated by the potentially malicious EA before distributing them. In Helios, we
define the credential cri := (IDi, ti), where IDi is a unique voter identity and ti is
an authentication token. The credential distributor first checks for all i, j ∈ [n]:
if i 6= j then IDi 6= IDj , and halts if the verification fails. Upon success, it ran-
domly sends each voter V` a credential though some human channels. Hence, we
define the set of CD transducers as MCD := {MCDσ }σ∈Sn , where Sn stands for
all possible permutations [n] 7→ [n].
We define the Helios ceremony quintuple 〈Setup,Cast,Tally,Result,Verify〉,
using the hash function H(·) as follows:
The Setup(1λ,O,V,U , T ) ceremony :
Each trustee transducer MTibi ∈
{
MT0 ,M
T
1
}
, i = 1, . . . , k sends signal to its
TSD. The TSD generates a pair of threshold ElGamal partial keys (pki, ski) and
sends pki together with a Schnorr (strong Fiat-Shamir) NIZK proof of knowledge
of ski to the EA. In addition, the TSD returns a trustee secret s¯i := (H(pki), ski)
to MTibi . If there is a proof that EA does not verify, then EA aborts the protocol.
Next, EA computes the election public key pk =
∏
i∈[k] pki. The public param-
eters, info, which include the election public key pk and the partial public keys
pk1, . . . , pkk as well as their NIZK proofs of knowledge are posted in the BB by
the EA.
Trustee auditing step [37]: for i = 1, . . . , k, if bi = 1, then M
Ti
bi
sends
H(pki) to its ASD, and the ASD will fetch info from the BB to verify if there
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exists a partial public key pk∗ such that its hash matches H(pki). In case this
verification fails, Ti sends a message ‘Invalid public key’ to all the voters via the
human communication channels shown in Figure 1.
Finally, the EA generates the voter credentials cr1, . . . , crn, where cri :=
(IDi, ti), and ti is a random authentication code. Then, forwards the credentials
to the CD transducer MCD. The CD transducer MCDσ checks the uniqueness of
each IDi and distributes them to the voter transducers Mi`,c`,a` for ` ∈ [n],
according to the permutation σ over [n] that specifies its behaviour.
The Cast ceremony :
For each voter V`, the corresponding transducer Mi`,c`,a` has a pre-defined
number of i` ballot auditing steps, where i` ∈ [0, q]. The input of Mi`,c`,a` is
(cr`,U`). If V` has received an ‘Invalid public key’ from at least one trustee, then
it aborts the ceremony. If no such message was sent, then for u ∈ [i`], the
following steps are executed:
1. Mi`,c`,a` sends (ID`,U`) to its VSD, labelled as VSD`. Let optj` be the option
selection of V`, i.e. U` = {optj`}.
2. For j = 1, . . . ,m, VSD` creates a ciphertext, C`,j , that is a lifted ElGa-
mal encryption under pk of 1, if j = j` (the selected option position), or
0 otherwise. In addition, it attaches a NIZK proof pi`,j showing that C`,j
is an encryption of 1 or 0. Finally, an overall NIZK proof pi` is gener-
ated, showing that exactly one of these ciphertexts is an encryption of 1.
These proofs are strong Fiat-Shamir transformations of disjunctive Chaum-
Pedersen (CP) proofs [15]. To generate the CP proofs, the unique identifier
ID` is included in the hash. The ballot generated is ψ`,u = 〈ψ0`,u, ψ1`,u〉, where
ψ0`,u =
〈
(C`,1, pi`,1), . . . , (C`,m, pi`,m), pi`
〉
and ψ1`,u = H(ψ
0
`,u). The VSD re-
sponds to Mi`,c`,a` with the ballot ψ`,u.
3. Then, Mi`,c`,a` sends a Benaloh audit request to VSD`. In turn, VSD` returns
the randomness r`,u that was used to create the ballot ψ`,u. The Mi`,c`,a`
sends (ID`, ψ`,u, r`,u) to its ASD, which will audit the validity of the ballot. If
the verification fails, Mi`,c`,a` halts. If the latter happens and c` = 1,Mi`,c`,a`
outputs a special symbol ‘Complain’, otherwise it returns no output.
After the i`-th successfully Benaloh audit, Mi`,c`,a` invokes VSD` to produce a
new ballot ψ` as described in step 2 above; however, upon receiving ψ`, Mi`,c`,a`
now sends cr` to VSD`, indicating it to submit the ballot to the EA. The Mi`,c`,a`
then outputs audit` := (ID`, ψ
1
` ). If a` = 1, Mi`,c`,a` also outputs a special symbol
‘Audit’ which indicates that it will send audit` to ASD` which will audit the BB
afterwards, as specified in the Verify algorithm below.
When EA receives a cast vote (cr`, ψ`) from VSD`, it checks the validity of the
credential cr` and that ψ` is a well-formed ballot by verifying the NIZK proofs.
If the check fails, then it aborts the protocol. After voting ends, EA updates its
state with the pairs {(ψ`, ID`)}V`∈Vsucc of cast votes and the associated identifiers,
where Vsucc is the set of voters that voted successfully.
The Tally ceremony :
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In the Tally ceremony, EA sends {ψ`}V`∈Vsucc to all trustee transducers MTibi ’s
TSD, i = 1, . . . , k. Next, the TSD of each MTibi , i = 1, . . . , k, performs the
following computation: it constructs the product ciphertext Cj =
∏
V`∈Vsucc C`,j
for j = 1, . . . ,m. By the additive homomorphic property of (lifted) ElGamal,
each Cj is a valid encryption of the number of votes that the option optj received.
Then, the TSD uses ski to produce the partial decryption of all Cj , denoted by
xij , and sends it to the EA along with NIZK proofs of correct partial decryption.
The latter are Fiat-Shamir transformations of CP proofs. If there is a proof that
EA does not verify, then it aborts the protocol. After all trustees finish their
computation, EA updates τ with
{
(xi1, . . . , x
i
m)
}
i∈[k] and the NIZK proofs.
The Result(τ) algorithm :
For each option optj , the Result algorithm computes the number of votes,
xj , that optj has received using the partial decryptions x
1
j , . . . , x
k
j . The output
of the algorithm is the vector 〈x1, . . . , xm〉.
The Verify(τ, audit`) algorithm :
The algorithm Verify(τ, audit`) outputs 1 if the following conditions hold:
1. The structure of τ and all election information is correct (using info).
2. There exists a ballot in τ , indexed by ID`, that contains the hash value ψ
1
` .
3. The NIZK proofs for the correctness of all ballots in τ verify.
4. The NIZK proofs for the correctness of all trustees’ partial decryptions verify.
5. For j = 1, . . . ,m, xj is a decryption of C
′
j , where C
′
j is the homomorphic
ciphertext created by multiplying the respective ciphertexts in the ballots
published on the BB (in an honest execution, C′j should be equal to Cj).
4 E2E Verifiability of Helios e-Voting Ceremony
In a Helios e-voting ceremony, an auditor can check the correct construction
of the ballots and the valid decryption of the homomorphic tally by verifying
the NIZK proofs. In our analysis, it is sufficient to require that all NIZK proofs
have negligible soundness error (·) in the RO model. Note that in Section 3, we
explicitly modify Helios to associate ballots with the voters’ identities, otherwise
a clash attack [41] would break verifiability. For simplicity in presentation, we
assume that the identifiers are created by the adversary, i.e. the set {ID`}`∈[n]
matches the set of voters V.
Throughout our analysis, we assume the honesty of the CD and thus the
distribution of the credentials is considered to be an arbitrary permutation over
[n]. Since there are only two admissible trustee transducers MT0 ,M
T
1 , the distri-
bution of trustee transducers DTp is set as the p-biased coin-flip below:
Pr
DTp
[M ] =
{
p, if M = MT1
1− p, if M = MT0 (1)
Moreover, in the Cast ceremony, the ballots and individual audit information
are produced before the voters show their credentials to the system. Since the
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CD is honest, the adversary is oblivious the the maps between the credentials to
the voter transducers. The credentials are only required when the voters want
to submit their ballots, hence, according to the discussion in Remark 1, we will
consider only a universal voter transducer distribution D in the case study of
Helios. Namely, D1 = · · · = Dn = D.
4.1 Attacks on verifiability
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, we have modified Helios to pre-
vent the system from clash attacks [41]. For simplicity, we exclude all the trivial
attacks that the adversary may follow, i.e. the ones that will be detected with
certainty (e.g. malformed or unreadable voting interface and public information).
Therefore, the meaningful types of attack that an adversary may launch are the
following:
Collision attack: the adversary computes two votes which hash to the same
value. The collision resistance of the hash function H(·), prevents from these
attacks except from some negligible probability ′ 5.
Invalid vote attack: the adversary creates a vote for some invalid plaintext,
i.e. a vector that does not encode a candidate selection (e.g., multiple votes for
some specific candidate). This attack can be prevented by the soundness of the
NIZK proofs, except from the negligible soundness error . The NIZK verification
is done via the voter’s ASD.
VSD attack: the adversary creates a vote which is valid, but corresponds to
different selection than the one that the voter intended. A Benaloh audit at the
Cast ceremony step can detect such an attack with certainty, as the randomness
provided by the VSD perfectly binds the plaintext with the audited ElGamal
ciphertext.
BB attack: the adversary deletes/inserts an honest vote from/to the BB, or
replaces it with some other vote of its choice, after voting has ended. Assuming
no hash collisions, any such modification will be detected if the voter chooses to
audit the BB via her ASD.
Invalid tally decryption attack: the adversary provides a decryption
which is not the plaintext that the homomorphic tally vector encrypts. The
NIZK proofs of correct decryption prevent this attack, except for a negligible
soundness error .
Remark 2 (Completeness of the attack list). It can be easily shown that the
above list exhausts all possible attack strategies against Helios in our threat
model. Namely, in an environment with no clash, collision and invalid encryption
attacks, the set of votes is in the correct (yet unknown) one-to-one correspon-
dence with the set of voters, and all votes reflect a valid candidate selection of
the unique corresponding voter. As a result, a suitably designed vote extractor
will decrypt (in super-polynomial time) and output the actual votes from the
non-honest-and-successful voters, up to permutation. Consequently, if no honest
5 This requires that H(·) has resistance to second preimage attacks.
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vote has been modified during and after voting, and the homomorphic tally of
the votes is correctly computed and decrypted, then the perfect binding of the
plaintexts and ciphertexts of ElGamal implies that the decryption of the tally is
the intended election result.
4.2 Attacking the verifiability of Helios e-voting ceremony
As explained in the previous subsection, any attempt of collision, invalid vote
and invalid tally decryption attacks has negligible probability of success for the
adversary due to the collision resistance of the hash function and the soundness
of the ZK proofs. Therefore, in a setting where no clash attacks are possible, the
adversary’s chances to break verifiability rely on combinations of VSD and BB
attacks. The probability of these attacks being detected depends on the voter
transducer distribution D which depicts their auditing behaviour during and
after voting. In the following theorem, we prove that the verifiability of Helios
is susceptible to VSD or/and BB attacks, when the voters sample from a class
of assailable voter transducer distributions.
Theorem 1 (Vulnerability of Helios ceremony). Assume an election run
of Helios with n voters, m candidates and k trustees. Let q, δ, θ, φ ∈ N, where
0 < θ, φ ≤ n and q is the maximum number of Benaloh audits. Let D be a
(universal) voter transducer distribution s.t. for some κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1)
at least one of the two following conditions holds:
(i). There is an i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , q} that determines “ vulnerable VSD auditing
behaviour”. Namely, (i.a) the probability that a voter executes at least i∗
Benaloh audits is 1−κ1 AND (i.b) the probability that a voter, given that
she has executed at least i∗ Benaloh audits, will cast her vote after exactly
i∗ Benaloh audits is 1 − κ2 AND (i.c) the probability that a voter, given
that she will execute exactly i∗ Benaloh audits, will not complain in case
of unsuccessful audit is κ3.
(ii). There is a subset J ∗ ⊆ {0, . . . , q} that determines “ vulnerable BB au-
diting behaviour”. Namely, (ii.a) the probability that a voter executes j
Benaloh audits for some j ∈ J ∗ is 1 − µ1 AND (ii.b) for every j ∈ J ∗,
the probability that a voter, given she has executed j Benaloh audits, will
not audit the BB is at least 1− µ2.
Let D = 〈D, . . . ,D,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉 be a transducer distribution vector
where DTi = DTpi , i = 1, . . . , k, is the pi-biased coin-flip trustee transducer distri-
bution in Eq. (1) for arbitrary pi ∈ [0, 1] and DCD is an arbitrary CD transducer
distribution. Then, there is a PPT adversary A that wins the E2E verifiability
ceremony game GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) in Figure 2 for any vote extractor E,
any ∆ ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
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I under condition (i), provided the parameters d, θ, φ satisfy:
δ ≤ (1−∆)2(1− κ2)(1− κ1)n
θ ≤ n− (1 +∆)(κ2 +∆−∆κ2)(1− κ1)n
φ ≥ (1 +∆)2κ3(κ2 +∆−∆κ2)(1− κ1)n
with probability of success at least 1− 5e−κ3β2β1∆
2
3
where β1 = (1−∆)(1− κ1)n and β2 = (κ2 −∆+∆κ2)(1− κ2) .
I under condition (ii), provided the parameter δ satisfies δ ≤ (1−∆)(1−µ1)n
with probability of success at least (1− e−(1−µ1)n∆
2
2 )(1− µ2)δ .
Proof. We prove the Theorem in Appendix B.
4.3 End-to-end verifiability theorem Helios e-voting ceremony
In this subsection, we prove the E2E verifiability of Helios e-voting ceremony
in the RO model, when the voter transducer distribution satisfies two condi-
tions. As we will explain at length in the next subsection, these conditions are
logically complementary to the ones stated in Theorem 1, as long as the com-
plaining behaviour of the voters is balanced (i.e. the voters have 1/2 probability
of complaining in case of unsuccessful termination).
Theorem 2 (Verifiability of Helios ceremony). Assume an election run
of Helios with n voters, m candidates and k trustees. Assume that the hash
function H(·) considered in Section 3 is a random oracle. Let q, δ, θ, φ ∈ N,
where 0 < θ, φ ≤ n and q is the maximum number of Benaloh audits. Let D be
a (universal) transducer distribution and some κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1) s.t. the
two following conditions hold:
(i) There is an i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , q + 1} that guarantees “ resistance against VSD
attacks”. Namely, (i.a) the probability that a voter executes at least i∗
Benaloh audits is κ1 and (i.b) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, if i < i∗, then the
probability that a voter, given that she will execute at least i Benaloh audits,
will cast her vote after exactly i Benaloh audits, is no more than κ2 AND
the probability that a voter, given that she will execute exactly i Benaloh
audits, will complain in case of unsuccessful audit is at least 1− κ3.
(ii) There is a subset J ∗ ⊆ {0, . . . , q} that guarantees “ resistance against BB
attacks”. Namely, (ii.a) the probability that a voter executes j Benaloh
audits for some j ∈ J ∗ is 1−µ1 AND (ii.b) for every j ∈ J ∗, the probability
that a voter, given she has executed j Benaloh audits, will audit the BB is
at least 1− µ2.
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Let D = 〈D, . . . ,D,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉 be a transducer distribution vector
where DTi = DTpi , i = 1, . . . , k, is the pi-biased coin-flip trustee transducer distri-
bution in Eq. (1) for arbitrary pi ∈ [0, 1] and DCD is an arbitrary CD transducer
distribution. Then, for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1) for any δ, θ, and under the constraint
φ ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)
( 1
(1 +∆)κ2
− 1
)(δ
2
− (1 +∆)κ1n
)
,
the Helios e-voting ceremony achieves E2E verifiability for D, a number of θ
honest successful voters, a number of φ honest complaining voters and tally de-
viation δ with error
e−min
{
κ1n
∆2
3 , µ1n
∆2
3 , γ(
δ
2−(1+∆)κ1n)∆
2
3 , ln
(
1
µ2
)
( δ2−(1+∆)µ1n)
}
+
+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) ,
where γ = min
{
κ2 ,
3
2 (1− κ3)
(
1
(1+∆)κ2
− 1)} .
Proof. We prove the Theorem in Appendix C.
4.4 Illustrating Theorems 1 and 2
In order to provide intuition, we provide examples of assailable and resistant
voter transducer distributions, viewed as graphs, in Appendix D.
4.5 On the tightness of the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2
The conditions stated in Theorems 1 and 2 determine two classes of voter trans-
ducer distributions that correspond to vulnerable and insusceptible settings, re-
spectively. We observe that weakening the condition (i) of Theorem 1 (resp. (i)
of Theorem 2) cannot imply vulnerability (resp. security). Namely, in condition
(i) of Theorem 1, if one of (1.a),(1.b) or (1.c) does not hold, then the adversary
cannot be certain that it will achieve a sufficiently large deviation from VSD at-
tacks without increasing rapidly the number of complaints. On the other hand,
if condition (i.a) of Theorem 2 does not hold, then E2E verifiability cannot be
preserved when (1.b) becomes a disjunction, since a high complaint rate alone
is meaningless if the adversary has high success rate of VSD attacks.
Consequently, it is not possible to achieve logical (i.e. probability thresholds
are considered either sufficiently high or sufficiently low) tightness for interest-
ing sets of parameters d, θ, φ only by negating the conditions of each of the two
theorems. However, this is possible if we assume that the voter’s complaining
behaviour is balanced by flipping coins in order to decide whether they will com-
plain in case of unsuccessful termination, i.e. if we set κ3 = 1− κ3 = 1/2. For a
more detailed discussion on the tightness of the conditions, see Appendix E.
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5 Voter Privacy of Helios e-Voting Ceremony
In this section, we prove the voter privacy of the Helios e-voting ceremony. The
proof is carried out via a reduction. Namely, we show that if there exists a
PPT adversary A that wins the voter privacy/PCR game for Helios with non-
negligible distinguishing advantage, then there exists a PPT adversary B that
breaks the IND-CPA security of the ElGamal encryption scheme with blackbox
access to A. Throughout the proof, we view H(·) as a RO.
Theorem 3 (Voter Privacy of Helios ceremony). Assume an election run
of Helios with n voters, m candidates and k trustees. Assume that the hash
function H(·) considered in Section 3 is a random oracle and the underlying
ElGamal encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure. Let t, v ∈ N, where t, v < n.
Let D = 〈D, . . . ,D,DT1 , . . . ,DTk ,DCD〉 be a transducer distribution vector
where DTi = DTpi , i = 1, . . . , k, is the pi-biased coin-flip trustee transducer
distribution in Eq. (1) for arbitrary pi ∈ [0, 1] and DCD is an arbitrary CD
transducer distribution.
Assume that p1, . . . , pk are sorted in increasing order as pi1 ≤ · · · ≤ pik .
Then, Helios e-voting ceremony achieves voter privacy with error
1
2
·
k−t∏
x=1
(1− pix) + negl(λ)
for D, at most t corrupted trustees and v corrupted voters.
Proof. We prove the Theorem in Appendix F.
6 Evaluating the E2E verifiability of an e-voting
ceremony
In this section, we evaluate our results for the E2E verifiability of Helios, by
instantiating the bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 for various voter transducer dis-
tributions. Our evaluations are separated into two categories: (i) evaluations that
are based on actual human data that derive from elections using Helios and (ii)
evaluations that are based on simulated data for various sets of parameters.
6.1 Evaluations based on human data.
Our human data are sampled from two independent surveys: the first sample
is from the member elections of the Board of Directors of the International As-
sociation for Cryptographic Research (IACR); the second is a non-binding poll
among the students of the Department of Informatics and Telecommunications
(DI&T) of the University of Athens. Due to space limitations, we present at
length the methodology for both our surveys in Appendix G.1. Here, we provide
the outcome of our experiments in Table 1; that is, the instantiation of param-
eters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 of Theorem 1 for the IACR and the DI&T surveys. For
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both surveys, no complaints or audit failures were reported. Hence, due to lack
of data, we choose a “neutral” value for κ3 equal to 0.5 (see also Subsection 4.5).
Note that our analysis will hold for any other not close to 0 value of κ3. The case
of κ3 = 0, i.e., when the voter always complains to the authority when a Be-
naloh audit goes wrong, would make VSD attacks unattractive in the case that
φ is small and would suggest that the attacker will opt for BB attacks (if such
attacks are feasible which depends on µ1, µ2). The parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2
used in Theorem 1 express the vulnerability of Helios voting ceremony against
verifiability attacks w.r.t. a specific voter transducer distribution. We observe
that parameters κ1, κ3, µ1 determine the size of the subsets of vulnerable voters,
while κ2, µ2 can be seen as measures of the quality of the VSD and BB attacks.
Analysis of the IACR survey
From the first row of Table 1, we read that µ2 = 0.084 which is a very
small value as opposed to κ2 = 0.315. Thus, we expect that elections where
the electorate follows the voter transducer distribution of IACR elections are
much more vulnerable to BB attacks rather than VSD attacks. Indeed, this is
consistent with the analysis that we describe below.
We computed the percentage of tally deviation/No. of voters that the adver-
sary can achieve when the success probability is lower bounded by 25%, 10%, 5%
and 1% for various electorate scales. Specifically, we observed that the success
probability bounds stated in Theorem 1 express more accurately the effective-
ness of the adversarial strategy for (i) medium to large scale elections when the
adversary attacks via the VSD and (ii) for small to medium scale elections when
the adversary attacks via the BB. As a consequence, we present our analysis for
n = 100, 500, 1000, 2500 and 5000 voters w.r.t. BB attack effectiveness and for
n = 5000, 10000 and 50000 voters w.r.t. VSD attack effectiveness.
The data in Table 2 illustrate the power of BB attacks against compact bodies
of voters (e.g. organizations, unions, board elections, etc.) where BB auditing is
rare. We can see that in the order of hundreds, more than 5% of the votes could
be swapped with significant probability of no detection. This power deteriorates
rapidly as we enter the order of thousands, however, the election result could
still be undermined, as deviation between 1%-2%, is possible, without the risk of
any complaint due to unsuccessful engagement in the Cast ceremony (i.e. θ = n
and φ = 0). Therefore, even in a setting of high complaint rate (κ3 is close to
0), the adversary may turn into a BB attack strategy and still be able to alter
Survey i∗ J ∗ Parameters
κ1 κ2 κ3 µ1 µ2
IACR elections 0 {0} 0 0.315 0.5 0.315 0.084
DI&T poll 1 − 0.408 0.069 0.5 − −
Table 1: Instantiated parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 of Theorem 1 for the IACR and the
DI&T surveys.
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Voters
Success probability %
≥ 25 ≥ 10 ≥ 5 ≥ 1
100 15.92 26.4 34.42 51.42
500 3.18 5.28 6.87 10.56
1000 1.59 2.64 3.42 5.28
2500 0.636 1.05 1.37 2.11
5000 0.31 0.52 0.68 1.05
Table 2: Percentage of tally deviation/No. of voters achieved in elections under BB
attack strategies against electorates following the voter transducer distribution of IACR
elections. The attack succeeds even when θ = n and φ = 0.
radically the election result, as marginal differences are common in all types of
elections. We stress that from published data we are aware of, there have been
elections for the IACR board where the votes for winning candidates were closer
than 3% to the votes of candidates that lost in the election. Therefore, if the
voter distribution had been as the one derived by Table 1, and 500 members had
voted, the result could have been overturned with success probability 25% even
if a single complaint was considered to be a “stop election event” (since φ = 0).
To provide more context, in Table 3, we provide the cutoff between elected
and non-elected candidates for the last 10 years of IACR elections for the Board
of Directors, followed by the exact success probability of a hypothetical BB
attack strategy to overturn the election result given the actual number of cast
ballots per year. We observe that the attacker success probability for many of
the elections is considerable (2011,2014,2015), or even unacceptable (2006, 2008,
2009, 2013), at least in our estimation.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of a VSD attack strategy against an
election that follows the voter distribution in IACR elections would not have
a great impact unless an unnatural number of complaints could be tolerated.
Indeed, from our evaluation, it appears even for the scale of 5000, 10000 and
50000 that voters, the rate of complaints that is ignored must be close to 24%,
21% and 17% respectively, which is rather unacceptable in a real world setting.
Such number of complaints would most definitely lead to a stop election event.
We conclude that the IACR voter behaviour is susceptible to BB attacks
with significant probability of success but not VSD attacks unless there is high
tolerance in voter complaints.
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Year Participants Cutoff % Success probability %
2015 437 6.87 7.35
2014 575 5.57 6.17
2013 637 2.99 19.14
2012 518 11.59 0.5
2011 621 4.03 11.35
2010 475 8.64 2.82
2009 325 4.93 24.8
2008 312 0.33 91.66
2007 − − −
2006 324 4.33 29.57
Table 3: Success probability of a hypothetical BB attack strategy against the IACR
elections for the Board of Directors per election year. The success probability is com-
puted given the number of participants and the cutoff between the last elected director
and the first candidate that was not elected. The dashed line denotes the actual start
of Helios use for IACR elections. Regarding the year 2007, no data were recorded in
https://www.iacr.org/elections/.
Analysis of the DI&T poll
Due to space limitations, we present the analysis of the DI&T poll in Ap-
pendix G.2.
6.2 Evaluations based on simulated data
Our human data analysis is obtained by real bodies of voters that have an
imperfect voting behaviour. To understand what would be the security level of a
Helios e-voting ceremony when executed by an “ideally trained” electorate, we
evaluated the security of simulated elections. Namely, we computed the detection
probability that Theorem 2 can guarantee defined as (1 − ) · 100%, where  is
the error stated in Theorem 2.
In our evaluation, we observed that when the complaint rate is balanced,
acceptable levels of security (e.g., (tally deviation)/(No. of voters) ≤ 3% or de-
tection probability ≥ 99%) can be achieved only when a very small rate of com-
plaining voters can be allowed (≤ 1%). As a result, the auditing and complaining
behaviour of the voters must be almost ideal in order for a high level of security
to be achieved. For a more detailed analysis of our result, see Appendix G.3.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced the concept of ceremonies to the setting of e-voting systems.
Our framework enables the modelling of all human participants to an e-voting
protocol as nodes in the protocol execution. Human nodes are modelled as ran-
dom variables over a set of admissible protocol behaviours which are described
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by (finite state) transducers. Our analysis enables the exploration of feasibility
and infeasibility results regarding the verifiability of the Helios system (suitably
modified to be a ceremony) conditioning on general classes of possible voter be-
haviours. The results from our characterization are essentially tight in the sense
that behaviours excluded from our security theorem are too weak/predictable
to offer a reasonable level of verifiability.
Our results are only an initial step in the direction of fully incorporating hu-
man behavior and interaction within cryptographic modeling. There are many
ways to extend the way human nodes are affected by the environment (e.g.,
taking into account the timing of other nodes) or being manipulated to perform
the protocol steps in a wrong order (cf. [32]). Still, even with our limited anal-
ysis, we demonstrated that current election procedures, even those performed
by cryptographers, are extremely prone to manipulation. Our positive results,
albeit also modest, show that there exist behaviors that if uniformly regimented
they can provide a reasonable level of e-voting security. Designing e-voting pro-
tocols for which this set of behaviors can be efficiently learnable by humans is a
further interesting direction motivated by our work.
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A Threat model for e-voting ceremonies
A.1 Threat model for E2E verifability
The entities that are adversarially controlled in the E2E verifiability game are
presented in Figure 4.
EA
CD
BB
T1ASD TSD
T2ASD TSD
...
TkASD TSD
...
VnVSD ASD
V2VSD ASD
V1VSD ASD
Fig. 4: The adversarial setting during an attack against E2E verifiability of an e-voting
ceremony where V1 is corrupted. The system nodes that are controlled by the adversary
are denoted in black colour.
A.2 Threat model for voter privacy
The entities that are adversarially controlled in the voter privacy game are pre-
sented in Figure 5.
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EA
CD
BB
T1ASD TSD
T2ASD TSD
...
TkASD TSD
...
VnVSD ASD
V2VSD ASD
V1VSD ASD
Fig. 5: The adversarial setting during an attack against Voter Privacy of an e-voting
ceremony where V1 and T1 are corrupted. The system nodes that are controlled by the
adversary are denoted in black colour.
A.3 Alternative directions
Zero complaint tolerance for BB auditing The description of the E2E verifiabil-
ity game in Figure 2 addresses BB audit fails asymmetrically w.r.t. the Benaloh
audit case. Namely, instead of inserting tolerance of up to a number (φ) com-
plaints, every one of the voters that verify their ballot in the BB must do so
successfully. The reason for this distinction is the timing that the two types of
verifications happen. Namely, Benaloh audit is executed during the online voting
phase. In case of fail, nothing beyond the voter aborting the Cast ceremony is
at risk, which can be seen as an implicit denial of service attack. Such attacks
are unavoidable anyway in an all-malicious environment and are deliberately not
captured by our E2E verifiability definition. On the contrary, since BB auditing
takes place after election ends, the attacked voters have already suffered manip-
ulation of their votes. A more general approach would allow the adversary to
win in the case that the number of failed BB audits is up to a threshold χ. This
would generalize our present approach which assumes χ = 0. We leave this for
future work.
EA and CD corruption. In our framework, we assumed that the CD can be ma-
licious in the voter privacy game while it is kept honest for E2E verifiiability. In
addition, EA is malicious where as the honest voters’ VSDs remain uncorrupted
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for privacy. This choice is made for consistency with the level of security that
Helios [1] as well as most client-side encryption e-voting systems can provide
(e.g. [21,31]). Namely, since the vote is encrypted in the voter’s VSD, knowing
the credential of the voter alone does not suffice for breaking her privacy. On the
other side, for E2E verifibiality it is important that an honest authority verifies
the uniqueness of the credentials, otherwise the election is susceptible to “clash
attacks” [41]. If one wishes to study the security of votecode-based e-voting
systems (e.g. [12,14,36]), then they would have to take the opposite approach.
In such systems, the credentials generated by the EA contain encodings of the
options that are personal for each voter, therefore EA and CD have to be honest
for voter privacy. On the other hand, these systems have mechanisms during
the Cast ceremony, that inherently guarantee resistance against clash attacks,
hence corrupting the CD does not affect their E2E verifiability. In addition, VSD
corruption does not violate privacy since the encodings cast during voting do not
leak information about the respective encoded options. We leave this for future
work.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We observe that when an adversary makes no voter corruptions, then
the set V \ Vsucc contains only honest voters that did not complete the Cast
ceremony successfully. Therefore, the election result w.r.t. V \Vsucc is zero, so in
our analysis we can fix the trivial vote extractor E that outputs the zero vector
of length |V \ Vsucc|. By definition, if the adversary breaks the E2E verifiability
game for E , then it does so for any other vote extractor.
We denote by Ei,c,a the event that the honest voter engages in the Cast
ceremony by running the transducer Mi,c,a. We study the following two cases:
Case 1. Condition (i) holds [Breaking verifiabiliy via VSD attacks]. We de-
scribe a PPT adversary A1 against verifiabiilty as follows: A1 corrupts no voters
and observes the number of Benaloh audits that each voter performs. If the voter
has executed i∗ Benaloh audits, then A1 performs a VSD attack on the i∗+1-th
ballot that the voter requests.
By condition (i.a), the probablity that the voter will perform at least i∗
Benaloh audits is 1− κ1.
Let T be the number of VSD attacks that A1 executes. It is easy to see
that T follows the binomial distribution B(n, 1−κ1). Therefore, by the Chernoff
bounds we have that for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[(1−∆)(1− κ1)n < T < (1 +∆)(1− κ1)n] ≥
≥ 1− e−(1−κ1)n∆2/2 − e−(1−κ1)n ∆
2
min{2+∆,3} ≥ 1− 2e−(1−κ1)n∆
2
3 .
(2)
Let XT be the number of successful VSD attacks out of all the T attempts.
Observe that each successful single VSD attack adds 1 to the total tally deviation
(the ballot encrypts a candidate vector that is different from the voter’s intended
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selection). Hence, A1 achieves tally deviation exactly XT . From condition (i.b),
the probability that a voter, given that she has executed at least i∗ Benaloh
audits, will execute exactly i∗ Benaloh audits is 1− κ2.
By definition, XT follows the binomial distribution B(T, 1 − κ2). Thus, by
the Chernoff bounds, we have that for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[(1−∆)(1− κ2)T < XT < (1 +∆)(1− κ2)T ] ≥
≥ 1− e−(1−κ2)T ∆
2
2 − e−(1−κ2)T ∆
2
min{2+∆,3} ≥ 1− 2e−(1−κ2)T ∆
2
3 .
(3)
According to the description of A1, the number of honest voters that will not
complete the Cast ceremony successfully is T −XT ≥ 0. Therefore, the number
of successful honest voters is |Vsucc| = n − (T −XT ). In addition, by condition
(i.c), the number of complaining voters |Vcomp| follows the binomial distribution
B(T −XT , κ3). Hence, by the Chernoff bounds, we have that for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[|Vcomp| < (1 +∆)κ3(T −XT )] ≥ 1− e−κ3(T−XT )∆
2
3 . (4)
By description, A1 will definitely win the game GA1,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1λ, n,m, k) when(
XT ≥ δ
) ∧ (n− (T −XT ) ≥ θ) ∧ (|Vcomp| ≤ φ).
Based on the above observation, we provide a lower bound on the probabil-
ity that A1 wins the E2E verifiabiilty game GA1,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1λ, n,m, k) when the
parameters δ, θ, φ satisfy the following constraints:
δ ≤ (1−∆)2(1− κ1)(1− κ2)n (5a)
θ ≤ n− (1 +∆)(κ2 +∆−∆κ2)(1− κ1)n (5b)
φ ≥ (1 +∆)2κ3(κ2 +∆−∆κ2)(1− κ1)n (5c)
By Eq. (2),(3) and (4), we have that for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[GA1,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1] ≥
≥ Pr
D
[(
XT ≥ (1−∆)2(1− κ2)(1− κ1)n
)∧
∧ (|Vcomp| ≤ (1 +∆)2κ3(κ2 +∆−∆κ2)((1− κ1)n)∧
∧ (T −XT ) ≤ (κ2 +∆−∆κ2)(1 +∆)(1− κ1)n] ≥
≥ 1− 5e−κ3(κ2−∆+∆κ2)(1−κ2)(1−∆)(1−κ1)n∆
2
3 = 1− 5e−κ3β2β1∆
2
3 ,
(6)
where β1 = (1−∆)(1− κ1)n and β2 = (κ2 −∆+∆κ2)(1− κ2).
Case 2. Condition (ii) holds [Breaking verifiabiliy via BB attacks]. We de-
scribe a PPT adversary A2 against verifiabiilty as follows: A2 makes no cor-
ruptions and keeps record of the voters that perform j Benaloh audits for some
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j ∈ J ∗. Let VJ ∗ be the set of those voters. After all Cast ceremonies have been
completed, every voter has terminated successfully, i.e. Vsucc = V and Vcomp = ∅.
In order to achieve tally deviation δ, A2 performs a BB attack on the votes of
an arbitrary subset of d voters in VJ ∗ . As in the previous case, each single BB
attack adds 1 to the total tally deviation, so |VJ ∗ | ≥ δ must hold. By condition
(ii.a), the probability Pr
D
[∨
j∈J ∗
c,a∈{0,1}
Ej,c,a
)]
that a voter is in VJ ∗ is 1 − µ1.
By definition, |VJ | follows the binomial distribution B(n, 1− µ1). Thus, by the
Chernoff bound and for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[|VJ ∗ | > (1−∆)(1− µ1)n] ≥ 1− e(1−µ1)n∆
2
2 . (7)
However, A2 will be successful iff all d voters in the selected subset of Vj do not
audit the BB. By condition (ii.b) and the independency of the voter transducers’
sampling, this happens with probability at least (1−µ2)δ. Therefore by Eq. (7),
we have that for δ ≤ (1−∆)(1− µ1)n and any θ, φ, it holds that
Pr
D
[GA2,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1] =
= Pr
D
[(
GA2,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∧ (|VJ | ≥ (1−∆)(1− µ1)n)] =
= Pr
D
[(
GA2,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∧ (|VJ | ≥ (1−∆)(1− µ1)n)] ≥
≥ (1− e−(1−µ1)n∆
2
2 )(1− µ2)δ.
(8)
Hence, by the lower bounds provided in Eq. (6),(8) and for δ ≤ (1−∆)(1−µ1)n,
we get the complete proof of the theorem. uunionsq
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. W.l.o.g., we assume that no trivial attacks are executed. Therefore the
adversary’s strategy comprises a combination of the attacks listed in Subsec-
tion 4.1. At first, we construct the vote extractor E as shown below:
Construction of the vote extractor for Helios :
The vote extractor E for Helios receives as input τ and the set of receipts
(list of IDs paired with hashes) {audit`}Vsucc . Then, E on input
(
τ, {audit`}Vsucc
)
executes the following steps:
1. If the result is not meaningful (i.e., Result(τ) = ⊥), then E outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, E arbitrarily arranges the voters in V \ Vsucc as 〈V E` 〉n−|Vsucc|.
2. For every ` ∈ [n− |Vsucc|]:
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(a) E reads the vote list in τ . It locates the first vote, denoted by ψE` , which
neither includes a hash appearing in {audit`}V`∈Vsucc , nor is associated
with some voter in V \ Vsucc, and associates this vote with V E` . If no such
vote exists, then E sets UE` = ∅ (encoded as the zero vector).
(b) E decrypts the ciphertexts in ψE` (in superpolynomial time). If the de-
crypted messages form a vector in {0, 1}m that has 1 in a single position,
j` , then it sets UE` = {optj`}. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
3. Finally, E outputs 〈UE` 〉V E
`
∈V\Vsucc .
Assume a PPT adversary A that wins the game GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1λ, n,m, k),
for the above vote extractor E . We denote by i` the number of Benaloh audits
that the honest voter V` executes. We denote by Ei,c,a the event that the voter
engages in the Cast ceremony by running the transducer Mi,c,a.
Let A be the event that at least one honest voter will audit the BB after
the end of the election, i.e. Vaudit 6= ∅. By condition (ii), the probability that
V` /∈ Vaudit is bounded by
Pr
D
[V` /∈ Vaudit] = PrD [Ei`,0,0 ∨ Ei`,1,0] =
= Pr
D
[(Ei`,0,0 ∨ Ei`,1,0) ∧ i` ∈ J ∗] + PrD [(Ei`,0,0 ∨ Ei`,1,0) ∧ i` /∈ J
∗] ≤
≤ Pr
D
[i` ∈ J ∗] + (1− PrD [i` ∈ J
∗]) · Pr
D
[Ei`,0,0 ∨ Ei`,1,0 | i` /∈ J ∗] ≤
≤ µ1 + (1− µ1)µ2 = µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2.
(9)
Therefore, by Eq. (9), the independence of the transducers’ sampling and the
fact that there are at least θ honest (and successful) voters, we have that
Pr
D
[¬A] = Pr
D
[ ∧
V`∈Vsucc
(V` /∈ Vaudit)
] ≤ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ. (10)
Let F be the event that A has performed at least one invalid vote or tally
decryption attack. Namely, one of the homomorphic tally ciphertexts Cj , for
j ∈ [m], does not decrypt as xj , or a ballot of a voter V` ∈ V does not correspond
to an encryption of a vector in {0, 1}m that has 1 in a single position. Assuming
that H(·) is a RO, all the NIZK proofs are sound except from a negligible error
. If Vaudit 6= ∅, there is at least one honest voter who verifies the ZK proofs.
Hence, it holds that
Pr
D
[
(
GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∧ F | A] ≤ (λ) = negl(λ) . (11)
Suppose that F does not occur. In this case, E outputs a vector of selections
that is a permutation of the adversarial votes and some zero vectors, thus it
homomorphically sums to the actual adversarial result. Therefore, A deviates
from the intended result f(〈U1, . . . ,Un〉) only because it
(i). alters some votes of the voters in Vsucc during voting, or
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(ii). replaces, deletes or inserts some of the votes of the (successful or unsuc-
cessful) honest voters in τ (BB).
By Remark 2, A achieves this by performing combinations of collision, VSD
and BB attacks. As mentioned in Subsection 4.1, the probability of a successful
collision attack (A provides V` with some individual audit information audit`
that has the same hash value as a another ballot of A’s choice) is no more than
a negligible function ′(λ).
We denote by X the set of the honest voters whose votes have been altered
during voting (VSD attack) and by Y the set of honest voters whose votes
have been replaced/deleted/inserted in the BB, both determined by A’s adaptive
strategy. Each of these attacks adds 1 to the total deviation, so the deviation
that A achieves is |X ∪ Y | = |X \ Y |+ |Y | ≥ δ.
W.l.o.g., we assume that X and Y are disjoint as any vote under VSD and
BB attack only lowers the probability of success of A, while adding no more
than 1 to the total tally deviation. In addition, we assume that |X| + |Y | = δ,
as any strategy of A s.t. |X| + |Y | > δ has success probablity which is upper
bounded by the one of a strategy for some VSD and BB attack sets X ′ ⊆ X and
Y ′ ⊆ Y s.t.|X ′|+ |Y ′| = δ. We provide upper bounds on the success probability
of A w.r.t. to each of the subsets X and Y for the case they become larger than
δ/2. Clearly, either |X| ≥ δ/2 or |Y | ≥ δ/2 must hold
Bounding A’s success probability w.r.t. X, when |X| ≥ δ/2 :
Let T the set of voters that A attempted a VSD attack. We partition T,X
into the following sets:
T− = {V` ∈ T |i` < i∗} and T+ = {V` ∈ T |i` ≥ i∗}
X− = {V` ∈ X|i` < i∗} and X+ = {V` ∈ X|i` ≥ i∗} ,
where i∗ is defined in condition (i) of the theorem’s statement. Clearly, X− ⊆ T−
and X+ ⊆ T+. By condition (i.a), |T+| is a random variable that follows the
binomial distribution Bin(n, κ1). By condition (i.b), for an arbitrary value z,
the probability Pr
D
[|X−| ≥ z] is no more than Pr[|X˜−| ≥ z], where |X˜−| is a
random variable that follows the binomial distribution Bin(|T−|, κ2).
By the syntax of Helios ceremony, the voters can complain only when they
are under under VSD atack, so it holds that Vcomp ⊆ T . Thus, we can partition
the set of complaining voters Vcomp into the two sets
V−comp = Vcomp ∩ T− and V+comp = Vcomp ∩ T+ .
By condition (i.b), for an arbitrary value z, the probability Pr
D
[|V−comp| ≤ z]
is no more than Pr[|V˜−comp| ≤ z], where |V˜−comp| follows the binomial distribution
Bin(|T−|−|X−|, 1−κ3). According to the above observations, for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1)
the following hold:
I Pr
D
[|X+| ≥ (1 +∆)κ1n] ≤ PrD [|T
+| ≥ (1 +∆)κ1n] ≤ e−κ1n∆
2
3 .
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I If |X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n, then |T−| ≥ |X−| > |X| − (1 +∆)κ1n.
I Pr
D
[|X−| ≥ (1 +∆)κ2|T−|] ≤ e−κ2|T−|∆
2
3 .
I If |X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n and |X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|, then
|T−| − |X−| >
( 1
(1 +∆)κ2
− 1
)(|X| − (1 +∆)κ1n) .
I Pr
D
[|V−comp| ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)(|T−| − |X−|)] ≤ e−(1−κ3)(|T
−|−|X−|)∆22 .
In order for A to be successful w.r.t. X it must hold that |V−comp| ≤ φ. Therefore,
since we assumed that |X| ≥ δ/2 and under the constraint that
φ ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)
( 1
(1 +∆)κ2
− 1
)(δ
2
− (1 +∆)κ1n
)
,
we have that
Pr
D
[(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2)] =
= max
{
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2)
∣∣∣ |X+| ≥ (1 +∆)κ1n],
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2) ∣∣ |X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n]} ≤
≤ max
{
Pr
D
[|X+| ≥ (1 +∆)κ1n],
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2) ∣∣ |X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n]} ≤
≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 ,
max
{
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2) ∣∣∣∣ (|X−| ≥ (1 +∆)κ2|T−|) ∧ (X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n)],
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2) ∣∣∣∣(|X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|) ∧ (X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n)]}} ≤
≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 , e−κ2(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)
∆2
3 ,
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2) ∣∣∣∣(|X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n) ∧ (|X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|)]} ≤
≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 , e−κ2(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)
∆2
3 ,
Pr
D
[|V−comp| ≤ φ ∣∣ (|X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n) ∧ (|X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|)]} ≤
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≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 , e−κ2(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)
∆2
3 ,
Pr
D
[|V−comp| ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)( 1(1 +∆)κ2 − 1
)(
|X| − (1 +∆)κ1n
) ∣∣
∣∣ (|X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n) ∧ (|X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|)]} ≤
≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 , e−κ2(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)
∆2
3 ,
Pr
D
[|V−comp| ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)(|T−| − |X−|) ∣∣∣∣ (|X+| < (1 +∆)κ1n) ∧ (|X−| < (1 +∆)κ2|T−|)] ≤
≤ max
{
e−κ1n
∆2
3 , e−κ2(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)
∆2
3 , e
−(1−κ3)
(
1
(1+∆)κ2
−1
)
(|X|−(1+∆)κ1n)∆22
}
≤
≤ e−min
{
κ1n , γ(
δ
2−(1+∆)κ1n)
}
∆2
3 ,
(12)
where γ = min
{
κ2 ,
3
2 (1− κ3)
(
1
(1+∆)κ2
− 1)} .
Bounding A’s success probability w.r.t. Y when |Y | ≥ δ/2 :
A replacement/deletion/insertion attack may be successful because (a) A has
computed an adversarial ballot with the same hash values ψ` (collision attack)
or (b) V` is not in Vaudit. Given the subset J ∗ in condition (ii) of the stament,
we partition Y into the subsets:
Y ∈ = {V` ∈ Y |i` ∈ J ∗} and Y /∈ = {V` ∈ Y |i` /∈ J ∗} .
By condition (ii.a), |Y /∈| follows the binomial distribution Bin(n, µ1). Moreover,
by condition (ii.b), the probability of a successful BB attack against any voter in
Y ∈ is upper bounded by µ2+′(λ) ( the voter does not audit the BB or A finds a
collision). Finally, in the case where |Y /∈| < (1+∆)µ1n, then |Y ∈| = |Y |−|Y /∈| >
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|Y | − (1 +∆)µ1n. Thus, by the Chernoff bounds and for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr
D
[(A successful w.r.t. Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ δ/2)] ≤
≤ max
{
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ δ/2) ∣∣ |Y /∈| ≥ (1 +∆)µ1n],
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ δ/2) ∣∣ |Y /∈| < (1 +∆)µ1n]} ≤
≤ max
{
Pr
D
[(|Y /∈| ≥ (1 +∆)µ1n],
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ δ/2) ∣∣ |Y /∈| < (1 +∆)µ1n]} ≤
≤ max
{
e−µ1n
∆2
3 ,
(
µ2 + 
′(λ)
)|Y ∈|} ≤
≤ max
{
e−µ1n
∆2
3 ,
(
µ2 + 
′(λ)
)|Y |−(1+∆)µ1n} ≤
≤ max
{
e−µ1n
∆2
3 , µ
δ
2 |−(1+∆)µ1n
2
}
+ negl(λ) =
≤ e−min
{
µ1n , ln
(
1
µ2
)
( δ2−(1+∆)µ1n)
}
+ negl(λ) .
(13)
By Eq. (10),(11),(12),(13) we conclude that for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1) and for any δ, θ,
the probabiity that A wins under the constraint
φ ≤ (1−∆)(1− κ3)
( 1
(1 +∆)κ2
− 1
)(δ
2
− (1 +∆)κ1n
)
,
is no more than
Pr
D
[GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1] =
= Pr
D
[(
GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∧A]+
+ Pr
D
[(
GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∧ (¬A)] ≤
≤ Pr
D
[(
GA,E,D,δ,θ,φE2E (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1
) ∣∣ (¬F ) ∧ (¬A)]+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) ≤
≤ max
{
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2)] ,
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| < δ/2)]}+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) ≤
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≤ max
{
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. X) ∧ (|X| ≥ δ/2)] ,
Pr
D
[
(A successful w.r.t. Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ δ/2)]}+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) ≤
≤ max
{
e−min
{
κ1n , γ(
δ
2−(1+∆)κ1n)
}
∆2
3 , e−min
{
µ1n , ln
(
1
µ2
)
( δ2−(1+∆)µ1n)
}}
+
+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) ≤
= e−min
{
κ1n
∆2
3 , µ1n
∆2
3 , γ(
δ
2−(1+∆)κ1n)∆
2
3 , ln
(
1
µ2
)
( δ2−(1+∆)µ1n)
}
+
+ (µ1 + µ2 − µ1µ2)θ + negl(λ) .
uunionsq
D Illustrating Theorems 1 and 2
Illustrating Theorem 1
We illustrate two representatives from the class of assailable voter transducer
distributions that correspond to conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 in Figures 6
and 7 respectively.
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No. of Benaloh audits0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 6: A voter transducer distribution with vulnerable VSD auditing behaviour
(i∗ = 1).
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Fig. 7: A voter transducer distribution with vulnerable BB auditing behaviour (J ∗ =
{0, 1, 3, 5}).
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Fig. 8: A voter transducer distribution with resistance against VSD and BB attacks
(κ1 = µ1 = 0.03125, κ2 = 0.5, µ = 0.08 w.r.t. i
∗ = 5, J ∗ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}). The length of
the bars is proportional to the probability of the corresponding event. Each grid box
denotes 10% probability mass.
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Illustrating Theorem 2
We illustrate an example of a voter transducer distributions that corresponds
to conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 in Figure 8.
E On the tightness of the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2
Given that κ3 = 1/2 is a “neutral” value, we can restate the conditions of
Theorems 1 and 2 in their logical form as follows:
Theorem 1 (logical version)
A voter transducer distribution is susceptible to VSD or/and BB attacks if
at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(i). There is an i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , q} such that (i.a) the probability that a voter
executes at least i∗ Benaloh audits is high AND (i.b) the probability that
a voter, given that she has executed at least i∗ Benaloh audits, will cast
her vote after exactly i∗ Benaloh audits is high.
OR
(ii). There is a subset J ∗ ⊆ {0, . . . , q} such that (ii.a) the probability that a
voter executes j Benaloh audits for some j ∈ J ∗ is high AND (ii.b) for
every j ∈ J ∗, the probability that a voter, given she has executed j Benaloh
audits, will not audit the BB high.
Theorem 2 (logical version)
A voter transducer distribution achieves resistance against VSD and BB at-
tacks if the following two conditions hold:
(i) There is an i∗ ∈ {0, . . . , q + 1} such that (i.a) the probability that a voter
executes at least i∗ Benaloh audits is low and (i.b) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , q},
if i < i∗, then the probability that a voter, given that she will execute at
least i Benaloh audits, will cast her vote after exactly i Benaloh audits is
low.
AND
(ii) There is a subset J ∗ ⊆ {0, . . . , q} such that (ii.a) the probability that a
voter executes j Benaloh audits for some j ∈ J ∗ is high AND (ii.b) for
every j ∈ J ∗, the probability that a voter, given she has executed j Benaloh
audits, will audit the BB is high.
Based on the above statements, we show that the following hold:
1. If condition (i) of Theorem 1 does not hold, then condition (i) of Theorem 2
holds: let I1 be the set of i ∈ {0, . . . , q} s.t. the probability that a voter executes
at least i Benaloh audits is high. By the negation of condition (i) of Theorem 1,
for every i ∈ I1, the probability that a voter, given that she will execute at least
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i Benaloh audits, will cast her vote after exactly i Benaloh audits is low. Observe
that I1 is not empty, as 0 ∈ I1. Therefore, if we set i∗ = max{i | i ∈ I1} + 1,
then, by definition, i∗ satisfies the conditions (i.a) and (i.b) of Theorem 2.
2. If condition (i) of Theorem 2 does not hold, then condition (i) of Theorem 1
holds: let I2 be the set of i ∈ {0, . . . , q + 1} s.t. the probability that a voter
executes at least i Benaloh audits is low. Clearly, I2 is non-empty, since q+ 1 ∈
I2). By the negation of condition (i) of Theorem 2, for every i ∈ I2 there is
an i′ < i s.t. the probability that a voter, given that she will execute at least i
Benaloh audits, will cast her vote after exactly i′ Benaloh audits is high. In this
case, we set i∗ to be this i′ that corresponds to the minimum i in I2 (note that
i∗ ≥ 0, since 0 /∈ I2). In both cases, i∗ satisfies the conditions (i.a) and (i.b) of
Theorem 1.
3. If condition (ii) of Theorem 1 does not hold, then condition (ii) of Theo-
rem 2 holds: by an averaging argument, there is a j ∈ {0, . . . , q} s.t. the prob-
ability that a voter executes j Benaloh audits is at least 1/(q + 1). Assuming
that the maximum number of Benaloh audits q is small (which is meaningful for
most interesting cases in practice), we can consider 1/(q+ 1) to be a sufficiently
high probability. By the negation of condition (ii) of Theorem 1, for singleton
{j}, the probability that a voter that executes j Benaloh audits wil audit the
BB is high. Thus, the set J ∗ that contains all j for which the voter executes j
Benaloh audits with probability at least 1/(q + 1) satisfies the conditions (ii.a)
and (ii.b) of Theorem 2.
4. The negation of condition (ii) of Theorem 2 implies the condition (ii) of
Theorem 1: by the negation of condition (ii) of Theorem 2, every j for which
the voter executes j Benaloh audits with probability at least 1/(q + 1) (high)
determines a subset ( singleton {j}) of low BB auditng probability. Thus, the
set J ∗ that contains all j for which the voter executes j Benaloh audits with
probability at least 1/(q+1) satisfies the conditions (ii.a) and (ii.b) of Theorem 1.
F Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let TrAud be the event that at least one of the honest trustees verifies
the correct posting of its partial public key. Since there are at most t corrupted
trustees in the set Tcorr, an every trustee Ti audits with probability pi, then by
definition of pix , x ∈ [k], and the fact that |Tcorr| ≤ t ⇒ |T \ Tcorr| ≥ k − t, we
have that
Pr[¬TrAud] =
∏
Ti∈T \Tcorr
(1− pi) ≤
|T \Tcorr|∏
x=1
(1− pix) ≤
k−t∏
x=1
(1− pix) . (14)
Assume now that TrAud occurs and let Tw be the honest trustee that audits. On
this condition, any attempt to replace the partial public key of Tw in the BB
board will result in Tw sending ‘Invalid public key’ messages to all honest voters
which will in turn abort the Cast ceremony. Therefore, it is straightforward
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that the adversary has zero advantage to guess b. As a result, we may restrict
to adversaries that leave Tw’s key intact.
On this condition, the proof consists of the (i) the construction of view sim-
ulator S for the voter privacy game, and (ii) the reduction showing that any ad-
versary who has non-negligible advantage in the voter privacy game can be used
to break the IND-CPA security of the underlying ElGamal encryption scheme.
The construction of view simulator S :
Recall that in the execution of the Cast ceremony, V` and VSD are controlled
by the challenger. V` behaves according to the sampled transducer Mi`,c`,a`
D`←−
MV , which audits the ciphertexts produced by the VSD i` times before en-
crypting its real candidate selection. For the j-th ciphertext auditing, it sends the
VSD the candidate selection Ub` and obtains the created ballot ψ`,j and the corre-
sponding randomness r`,j from the VSD. After the j-th auditing, it sends the can-
didate selection Ub` to the VSD and casts the created ballot ψ` together with its
identity ID`. The view of V` is defined as view` = 〈(Pub, s`,Ub` ), (ψ`,j , r`,j)j∈[i`], audit`〉,
where audit` = (ψ
1
` , ID`) is V`’s individual audit information.
The simulator S randomly picks a coin b′ ← {0, 1} on its first execution and
maintains the coin b′ throughout the privacy game. On input (view`,U0` ,U1` ),
S for j ∈ {1, . . . , i`} creates ballot ψ′`,j using a fresh randomness r′`,j for the
candidate selection Ub′` , as VSD would. It then outputs the simulated view
view′` = 〈(Pub, s`,Ub
′
` ), (ψ`,j , r`,j)j∈[i`], audit`〉, where audit` = (ψ1` , ID`) remains
the same.
The reduction :
Assume that A is a PPT adversary that wins GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1λ, n,m, k), for
some m, t, n, k ∈ N polynomial in λ. Recall that we are restricted in the case
where TrAud occurs. We construct an adversary B that invokes A in a blackbox
manner to attack the IND-CPA security of the ElGamal encryption. As shown
in [8], strong Fiat-Shamir transformations of Σ protocols are simulation sound
extractable. More specifically, for any prover A who outputs polynomially many
statement/proof pairs (Y,Π), there exists an efficient knowledge extractor K,
given black-box access to A and may invoke further copies of A using the same
randomness as was used in the main run, can extract a vector of witnesses w
corresponding to the statements Y.
Consider the following sequence of games from G0 to G3.
Game G0: The actual game G
A,S,D,t,v
priv (1
λ, n,m, k) given that TrAud occurs,
where the challenger uses Ub` in the Cast ceremony and the above simulator S
is invoked when b = 1.
Game G1: Game G1 is the same as Game G0 except the following. The
challenger C controls the ROH(·). After the Cast phase, C invokes the knowledge
extractor K to extract the partial secret keys {ski}i 6=w of all the other trustees
that A controls and the candidate selections of all the cast ballots submitted by
the corrupted voters. The challenger C aborts if the extraction fails; otherwise,
C completes the experiment
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Game G2: Game G2 is the same as Game G1 except the following. The
challenger C computes the election result 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 that corresponds to the
ballots that A posted on the BB according to the candidate selections of the
corrupted voters extracted in Game G1. Denote the final tally ElGamal cipher-
text vector as 〈C1, . . . , Cm〉, where Cj := (C(0)j , C(1)j ) = (grj , gxj · hrj ) for some
rj . For j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the trustee Tw produces its partial decryption of Cj as
Dw,j = C
(1)
j /(g
xj · (C(0)j )
∑
i6=w ski) together with simulated NIZK proofs without
using its partial secret key. Observe that this action is meaningful since Tw is
not replaced by A.
Game G3: Game G3 is the same as Game G2 except the following. For all
the honest voters V` ∈ V \Vcorr, the challenger C submits a vector of encryptions
of 0 together with the simulated NIZK proof instead of the real ciphertexts of
the candidate selections. Besides, the challenger C always give the adversary A
the simulated Cast views, ignoring the bit b.
Define AdvGi,Gj (A) :=
1
2
∣∣Pr[A = 1 | Gi] − Pr[A = 1 | Gj ]∣∣. We complete
the proof by showing a sequence of indistinguishability claims for the games
G0, G1, G2, G3.
I G0 is indistinguishable from GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1λ, n,m, k): by definition of the
the voter privacy game,∣∣Pr[GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1 | TrAud]− Pr[A = 1 | G0]∣∣ = 0.
I G1 is indistinguishable from G0: the probability that the knowledge ex-
tractor fails to extract the witnesses is negligible . Upon successful extraction,
the view of A is identical to G0. Hence, we have AdvG0,G1(A) = negl(λ).
I G2 is indistinguishable from G1: since the simulated NIZK proofs are
identical to the real ones, the view of A is identical to G1. Hence, we have
AdvG1,G2(A) = 0.
I G3 is indistinguishable from G2: it is easy to see that the tally ciphertexts
will still be decrypted to the correct election result 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 due to the fake
partial decryptions Dw,j . The simulated NIZK proofs are indistinguishable from
the real ones.
We now show that if the adversary A can distinguish Game G3 from G2 then
there exists an adversary B who can win the IND-CPA game of the ElGamal
encryption with the same probability. In particular, B executes the following
steps:
1. It guesses the index w ∈ [k] that corresponds to the auditing trustee Tw.
2. It first receives a public key denoted as (g, hw) from the IND-CPA challenger.
submits m0 = 0,m1 = 1 to the IND-CPA challenger, and B receives C :=
(C(0), C(1)) that encrypts mb∗ , where b
∗ ∈ {0, 1} is the IND-CPA challenger
bit for B to guess.
3. It computes
Cˆ := (Cˆ(0), Cˆ(1)) = (C(0), C(1) · (C(0))
∑
i6=w ski) ,
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which is encryption of mb∗ under the election public key (g, h).
4. It forwards (g, hw) together with the simulated NIZK to the EA as the partial
public key of the trustee Tw in the Setup phase.
5. If Tw does not audit the correct posting of (g, hw), then B aborts simulation
and returns a random bit.
6. During the Cast ceremony, for each uncorrupted voter V`, B sets j∗` to be
the index s.t. {Pj∗` } = Ub` .
7. It generates m−1 encryptions of 0, {C`,j}j 6=j∗` under the election public key
(g, h) together with their NIZK.
8. For j∗` , B sets C`,j∗` to be re-encryption of Cˆ, i.e. C`,j∗` = (Cˆ(0) ·grj , Cˆ(1) ·hrj )
for fresh randomness rj .
9. It appends necessary simulated NIZK and submits {C`,j}j∈[m] as the ballot
for V`.
10. It responds with A’s output.
Clearly, if C encrypts 0, then the adversary A’s view is the same as Game G3;
otherwise, if C encrypts 1, then the adversary A’s view is the same as Game G2.
Hence, assume A outputs 1 if it thinks it is engaged in Game G2 and outputs
0 if it thinks it is engaged in Game G3. B forwards A’s output and will win
the IND-CPA game whenever A guesses correctly, provided that B also guessed
correctly w ∈ [k] (with 1/k probability). Let TrGuess be the event that B guesses
correctly. We have that
1
2
+ AdvIND-CPAElGamal (B) =
= Pr[TrGuess] · Pr[B wins | TrGuess] + Pr[¬TrGuess] · Pr[B wins | ¬TrGuess] =
=
1
k
·
(1
2
+ AdvG2,G3(A)
)
+
(
1− 1
k
)
· 1
2
=
1
2
+
1
k
· AdvG2,G3(A)
(15)
By Eq. (15) and the security of the ElGamal encryption scheme, we get that
AdvG2,G3(A) = k · AdvIND-CPAElGamal (B) = negl(λ) .
I Pr[A = 1 | G3] = 1/2: since the view of Game G3 does not depend on the
bit b, the adversary’s probability of guessing b correctly in G3 is exactly 1/2.
By the above claims, the overall advantage of A given that TrAud occurs is∣∣∣∣ Pr[GA,S,Dt-priv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1 | TrAud]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ Pr[Pr[A = 1 | G0]− Pr[A = 1 | G3] ∣∣∣∣ ≤
≤
3∑
i=1
AdvGi−1,Gi(A) = negl(λ) + 0 + k · AdvIND-CPAElGamal (B) = negl(λ),
(16)
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Finally, by Eq. (14) and (16), we have that
Pr[GA,S,D,t,vpriv (1
λ, n,m, k) = 1] =
= Pr[¬TrAud] · Pr[GA,S,Dt-priv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1 | ¬TrAud]+
+ Pr[TrAud] · Pr[GA,S,Dt-priv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1 | TrAud] ≤
≤Pr[¬TrAud] + Pr[¬TrAud] · Pr[GA,S,Dt-priv (1λ, n,m, k) = 1 | TrAud] ≤
≤Pr[¬TrAud] + (1− Pr[¬TrAud]) · (1
2
+ negl(λ)
)
≤
≤1
2
+
1
2
· Pr[¬TrAud] + negl(λ) ≤
≤1
2
+
1
2
·
k−t∏
x=1
(1− pix) + negl(λ)
which completes the proof. uunionsq
G Appendix of Section 6
G.1 Methodology of our surveys with human subjects
The methodology for IACR elections
We conducted our survey using the SurveyMonkey tool. Specifically, we
formed a questionnaire that consisted of three questions, as shown in Figure 9.
QUESTIONNAIRE
Q1. In the last IACR election you participated, did you use the “audit your ballot”
functionality (where you get to see the opening of the ciphertext containing
your vote)?
Yes:  No: 
Q2. If you answered “Yes” in the above question, how many times did you audit?
Enter a positive integer: 
Q3. Did you verify that the smart ballot tracker (the hash of your submitted
ciphertext) was actually posted on the ballot tracking center (the public
web-site that lists all encrypted ballots)?
Yes:  No: 
Fig. 9: The questionnaire used in the survey on the voter’s behaviour at the
IACR elections.
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The questionnaire was delivered to the IACR board. In turn, the board sent
an open call to the IACR members for volunteering to participate in our survey.
By the end of the survey, we collected 35 responses, from which we extracted
the data presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Distribution of the voters’ VSD and BB auditing behaviour in the IACR
sample consisting of 35 responders.
Benaloh audits
0 1 2 3
BB audit Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
2 22 4 5 1 0 1 0
The methodology for DI&T poll
We conducted a non-binding poll among the students of the DI&T Depart-
ment of the University of Athens. During a lecture of the Computer Security
course, we gave a presentation of Helios, focusing on the importance of auditing
their ballots. Then, we asked the students to participate in an election run us-
ing Helios which concept concerned the improvement of their daily student life.
Specifically, the survey consisted of two stages; in the first stage, the students
had a period of one week prior to the election to form a proposal that would
reply to the following question:
Given a e 10,000 budget, which department facility
would you suggest that should be updated or developed?
In the second stage, at the voting phase, all the submitted proposals where
considered as options for the above question. In detail, the question as shown in
the Helios booth template is depicted in Figure 10.
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QUESTION
Given a e 10,000 budget, which department facility
would you suggest that should be updated or developed?
Select up to 2 options:
1. Improving WiFi coverage in all areas of the department building complex.

2. Extension of night lighting in all external areas of the building complex.

3. Printer room with off-hours student access. 
4. Extended access to student reading room via card based gate 
access control.
Fig. 10: The question template at the DI&T poll.
A total of 49 students participated in our survey. We modified the Helios
codebase so that our server could track the auditing behaviour of the partici-
pants. The data extracted from the voting process are presented in Table 5.
Benaloh audits
0 1 2
20 27 2
Table 5: Distribution of the voters’ VSD auditing behaviour at the DI&T poll. The
sample consists of 49 participants.
Parameter computation
The parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 used in Theorem 1 express the vulnerability
of Helios voting ceremony against verifiability attacks w.r.t. a specific voter trans-
ducer distribution. It is easy to see that every i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and J ⊆ {0, . . . , q}
(where q is the maximum number of Benaloh audits) imply a set of parameters
(κ1, κ2, κ3) and (µ1, µ2) that determine the success probability of an attacker
against the VSD vulnerability and the BB vulnerability when the voter executes
i and j ∈ J Benaloh audits respectively. The formulas and the security sig-
nificance of parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 is explained in Table 6. There, we can
deduce that parameters κ1, κ3, µ1 determine the size of the subsets of vulnerable
voters, while κ2, µ2 can be seen as measures of the quality of the VSD and BB
attacks.
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Parameter Formula for the parameter Security Significance
κ1 Pr
[∨
0≤t<i
c,a∈{0,1}
Et,c,a
] As κ1 decreases, the guarantee
that the voter will execute
at least i-Benaloh audits increases.
κ2 Pr
[∨
c,a∈{0,1}Ei,c,a |
∨
0≤t<i
c,a∈{0,1}
Et,c,a
] As κ2 decreases, the success
rate of a VSD attack after the
i-Benaloh audit increases.
κ3 Pr
[
Ei,0,0 ∨ Ei,0,1
] As κ3 decreases, the complaint
rate due to failed VSD attacks after
the i-Benaloh audit increases.
µ1 Pr
[∨
j /∈J
c,a∈{0,1}
Ej,c,a
] As µ1 decreases, the rate of
voters that “fall” into the
target subset J increases.
µ2 maxj∈J
{
Pr
[
Ej,0,1 ∨ Ej,1,1
]} As µ2 decreases, the success rate of a
BB attack against a voter that “falls”
into the target subset J increases.
Table 6: The formula and the security significance of parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 used
in Theorem 1 for given i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and J ⊆ {0, . . . , q}, where q is the maximum
number of Benaloh audits. Ei,c,a is the event that voter’s behaviour follows the trans-
ducer Mi,c,a.
In order to evaluate the vulnerability of the voter behaviour in each survey
we performed the following procedure:
I We focused on maximizing the success probability that each type of attack
may be mounted leaving the parameters δ, θ, φ as free variables6.
I For both surveys, no complaints or audit failures were reported. Hence, due
to lack of data, we choose a “neutral” value for κ3 equal to 0.5 (see also
Subsection 4.5). Note that our analysis will hold for any other not close to
0 value of κ3. The case of κ3 = 0, i.e., when the voter always complains to
the authority when a Benaloh audit goes wrong, would make VSD attacks
unattractive in the case that φ is small and would suggest that the attacker
will opt for BB attacks (if such attacks are feasible which depends on µ1, µ2).
I For both surveys, we ran an exhaustive search in all possible numbers of
Benaloh audits to locate the index i∗ s.t. the parameters κ1, κ2 that maximize
the probability of success stated in Theorem 1:condition (i). Equivalently,
we searched for the values κ1, κ2 that maximize the function
F∆(κ1, κ2) = (1− κ1)(κ2 −∆+∆κ2)(1− κ2)
for a suitably small value of ∆ ∈ [0, 1).
6 Following a different approach, one could also consider optimizing all parameters
simultaneously including δ, θ, φ. Performing such analysis could be interesting future
work; nevertheless, our analysis already reveals significant security deficiencies in our
experiments.
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I For the IACR survey, we ran an exhaustive search in all subsets of {0, 1, 2} to
locate the subset J ∗ s.t. the parameters µ1, µ2 that maximize the probability
of success stated in Theorem 1:condition (ii), lower bounded by the equation
(1− e−(1−µ1)n∆
2
2 )(1− µ2)δ, where ∆ ∈ [0, 1).
Since the probability bound drops exponentially as the tally deviation δ
increases, the effectiveness of the term (1 − e−(1−µ1)n∆22 ) quickly becomes
insignificant as compared with the term (1 − µ2)δ. Consequently, we con-
centrated on the asymptotic behaviour of the equation by searching for the
minimum µ2 that leads to a slower decreasing rate.
Survey i∗ J ∗ Parameters
κ1 κ2 κ3 µ1 µ2
IACR elections 0 {0} 0 0.315 0.5 0.315 0.084
DI&T poll 1 − 0.408 0.069 0.5 − −
Table 7: Instantiated parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 of Theorem 1 for the IACR and the
DI&T surveys.
Following the above procedure, we computed the optimal (from an adversarial
point of view) sets of parameters κ1, κ2, κ3, µ1, µ2 as shown in Table 7.
G.2 Analysis of the DI&T poll
From the second row of Table 7, we read that κ2 = 0.069 which is a very
small value. Therefore, we expect that voters’ behaviour in DI&T poll will be
vulnerable to VSD attacks. Our results are presented in Table 8.
Success probability % d/n θ/n φ/n
≥ 25 52.87 94.67 27.28
≥ 10 53.00 94.75 26.76
≥ 5 53.04 94.77 26.63
≥ 1 53.07 94.79 26.53
Table 8: Effectiveness of VSD attack strategies against electorates with n = 100000
voters following the voter transducer distribution of elections DI&T poll. In the tables,
δ/n · % is the percentage of tally deviation/No. of voters · %, θ/n · % is the ratio of
honest successful voters and φ/n ·% is the ratio of honest complaining voters.
It is easy to see that the data in Table 8 add to the intuition on the power
of the VSD attacks. One may observe that a very small value of κ2 = 0.069 for
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election DI&T poll leads to efficient attacks while keeping a very high rate of
honest voters (≈ 95%), as compared with the cases for elections IACR elections
(≈ 65%) where κ2 = 0.315.
In the analysis of Table 8, we scaled to 100000 voters so that the probability
bound in Theorem 1 reveals the effectiveness of the VSD attacker. Of course,
this does not mean that a medium scale election where the probability of a
successful VSD attack is 1−κ2 = 93.1% is not assailable. For instance, consider
an electorate of n = 500 voters following the transducer distribution of the DI&T
poll and a VSD attacker as the one described in the proof of Theorem 1. It easy
to show that the attacker can achieve tally deviation β% without any complaint
(i.e., θ = n and φ = 0 as in a BB attack strategy) with probability at least
(1− e−(1−κ1)n δ
2
2 )(1− κ2)βn = (1− e−148δ2)(0.931)500β , (17)
for d ≤ (1 − δ)296 and any δ ∈ [0, 1). In Table 9, we present the ratio of tally
deviation achieved by the attacker for various success probabilities, as derived
from Eq. (17). Observe that tally deviation 5% may occur with 16.7% probability,
which is certainly significant and reveals VSD vulnerability even at medium scale
elections.
Success probability %
≥ 25 ≥ 10 ≥ 5 ≥ 1
0.013 2.8 16.7 69.9
Table 9: Percentage of tally deviation/No. of voters achieved in elections under VSD
attack strategies against electorates of 500 voters following the voter transducer distri-
bution of DI&T poll. The attack succeeds even when θ = n and φ = 0.
We conclude that the DI&T voter behaviour is susceptible to VSD attacks
with significant probability. We cannot draw a conclusion for BB attacks since
we did not collect auditing data for this case.
G.3 Evaluations based on simulated data
The voter distributions we considered were chosen from the collection {Dp,q}p∈[0,1].q∈N
defined as follows: the voter flips a coin b with bias p to perform Benaloh audits
when b = 1, up to a maximum number of q audits. In any case of termination,
she flips a coin b′ with bias p to perform BB audit when b′ = 1.
By choosing as VSD resistance index i∗ = q and BB resistance set J ∗ =
{0, . . . , q − 1} we compute the parameters
κ1 = µ1 = p
q, κ2 = µ2 = 1− p ,
where we also set κ3 to the balanced parameter 1/2. Intuitively, this type of
voter behaviour should result in a sufficient level of resistance against of VSD
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and BB attacks, if the values 1 − p and pq are small enough. In order for this
to hold, the number of maximum allowed Benaloh audits q should be increased
when the bias p becomes larger, as otherwise the attacker could wait and attack
the VSD when q audits happen (which is likely if the audit rate is high).
Detection Probability
Distribution 90% 99% 99,9%
δ/n φ/n δ/n φ/n δ/n φ/n
D0.25,3 8.8 0.3 14.25 0.6 19.7 0.9
D0.25,5 3.44 0.01 6.63 0.03 9.83 0.04
D0.25,8
D0.25,10
D0.5,3
D0.5,5 7.98 0.2 9.08 0.4 10.19 0.61
D0.5,8 1.21 0.03 1.49 0.07 1.76 0.1
D0.5,10
D0.75,3
D0.75,5 54.41 1.32 56.62 2.61 58.8 3.91
D0.75,8 24.23 1.32 26.44 2.61 54.23 3.92
D0.75,10 14.06 0.25 14.62 0.51 15.17 0.77
Table 10: Security w.r.t. detection probability 90%, 99% and 99, 9% of (tally devia-
tion)/(No. of voters) percentage for elections with n = 250000 voters for distributions
Dp,q, where p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and q = 3, 5, 8, 10. The detection probability is defined
as (1− ) · 100%, where  is the error stated in Theorem 2. In the tables, δ/n ·% is the
percentage of tally deviation/No. of voters ·%, θ/n ·% is the ratio of honest successful
voters and φ/n ·% is the ratio of honest complaining voters.
By applying the above parameters in Theorem 2 and fluctuating p, q,∆, the
number of all voters n and honest voters θ, we compute the error expressed by
the following function
G∆(p, q, n) = e
−min
{
pqn∆
2
3 , γ(
δ
2−(1+∆)pqn)∆
2
3 , ln
(
1
1−p
)
( δ2−(1+∆)pqn)
}
,
where γ = min
{
1− p , 34
(
1
(1+∆)(1−p) − 1
)}
. Note that we omit the term (µ1 +
µ2−µ1µ2)θ and the negligible term, since they become very small for reasonably
large θ, λ.
As an example, we present our findings for n = 250000 voters for distributions
Dp,q, where p = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and q = 3, 5, 8, 10 in Table 10. The empty cells
appear when no meaningful error can be computed.
We observe that when the complaint rate is balanced, acceptable levels of
security (e.g., (tally deviation)/(No. of voters) ≤ 3% or error probability ≤ 1%)
can be achieved only when a very small rate of complaining voters can be allowed.
As a result, the auditing and complaining behaviour of the voters must be almost
ideal in order for a high level of security to be achieved.
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